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ABSTRACT 
  Administrative law judges attract little scholarly attention, yet they 
decide a large fraction of all civil disputes. In this Article, we 
demonstrate that these executive branch judges, like their counterparts 
in the judicial branch, tend to make predominantly intuitive rather 
than predominantly deliberative decisions. This finding sheds new 
light on executive branch justice by suggesting that judicial intuition, 
not judicial independence, is the most significant challenge facing 
these important judicial officers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Administrative law judges (ALJs) toil in the shadows of the civil 
justice system. They work for the executive branches of state and 
federal governments, usually embedded in specialized agencies. 
Located outside the courtrooms in which generalist judges preside, 
they comprise a “hidden judiciary.”1 
To citizens, however, the 14,100 ALJs2 are anything but hidden. 
They “adjudicate massive numbers of individual disputes, far 
exceeding the number resolved by courts.”3 They handle matters in 
many areas of concern to citizens and society, including “disability, 
retirement, and other income security entitlements; consumer, 
workplace, and environmental safety; labor relations and civil rights 
violations; and regulatory programs in industry, commerce, 
 
 1. See Thomas C. Mans, Selecting the ‘Hidden Judiciary’: How the Merit Process Works in 
Choosing Administrative Law Judges (Part I), 63 JUDICATURE 60, 60 (1979) (coining the term 
“hidden judiciary”). But see Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 323 (2002) (“We [administrative law judges] used to be 
referred to as the hidden judiciary; but you do not see that phraseology much any more.”). 
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES, 2007, at 9 tbl.1 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release No. 08-0620, rev. ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/ocwage.pdf (reporting that 14,100 “administrative law 
judges, adjudicators, and hearing officers” were employed in the United States in 2007). 
 3. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 
693, 693 (2005). 
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communications, banking, and transportation.”4 At the federal level, 
ALJs conduct at least nine times as many trials as federal judges.5 In 
short, ALJs are the “face of justice” for most American citizens.6 
The prevalence of administrative judging exposes a great irony 
concerning ongoing debates about judicial specialization. Scholars, 
pundits, and politicians periodically call for greater specialization 
among judges,7 typically motivated by concerns that generalist judges 
simply cannot master the many complex areas of law and fact 
involved in modern litigation. Although the most visible courts are 
composed of generalist judges, a surprisingly large percentage of 
disputes are adjudicated by specialist judges. The quiet delegation of 
judicial authority to administrative tribunals is a long-term trend that 
has arisen more out of necessity than out of a careful assessment of 
the benefits and costs of judicial specialization. The wisdom of this 
trend has received little serious consideration or empirical study. 
Using well-established psychological research methods, we seek to 
begin to fill that gap in this Article. 
Based on previous research involving generalist judges—federal 
district judges, state court judges, and federal magistrate judges—we 
have developed a model of judicial decisionmaking that explains how 
even well-qualified, experienced, and well-intentioned judges can 
make erroneous decisions. As we discuss in Part I, we have found that 
generalist judges appear to rely too heavily on intuition, rather than 
deliberation, when making judgments.8 We raise the theoretical 
 
 4. Daniel. L. Skoler, The Administrative Law Judiciary: Change, Challenge, and Choices, 
462 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 34, 36 (1982). 
 5. See Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing, and Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative 
Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 799 (2004) 
(reporting that while federal judges conducted a total of about 85,000 trials (defined as 
“contested hearings at which evidence is presented”) during 2001, just four federal 
administrative agencies (the SSA, the INS, the Board of Veterans Appeals, and the EEOC) 
conducted more than 720,000 trials that year); Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal 
Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1343 (1992) (“ALJs probably decide more 
‘cases’ each year than do their federal judicial counterparts.”). 
 6. Yoder, supra note 1, at 323. 
 7. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1228 (2006) (reviewing the demand for and the 
trends toward judicial specialization). 
 8. See generally Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on 
the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., 
Blinking] (proposing an intuitive-override model of decisionmaking and presenting relevant 
experimental evidence); Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the 
Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind] 
(reporting experimental evidence showing that judges are susceptible to misleading heuristics 
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possibility in Part II that administrative law judges—who tend to have 
greater subject-matter expertise and face more frequent 
decisionmaking oversight—might make better decisions than 
generalist judges. Part III then describes our empirical study of ALJ 
decisionmaking. In it, we attempt to sort out whether ALJs do in fact 
make more deliberative decisions than their generalist judge 
counterparts. We base our results on two different empirical 
investigations. First, as Part III.B explains, we report the results of a 
study designed to assess whether ALJs demonstrate a propensity to 
engage in impressionistic and intuitive problem solving or 
deliberative and reflective problem solving when faced with generic 
decision problems. Second, as Part III.C explains, we report the 
results of several experiments designed to assess whether ALJs 
demonstrate susceptibility or resistance to common “heuristics and 
biases”9 that have been shown to influence judicial decisionmaking. 
With regard to both, we find that ALJs, just like generalist judges, 
make predominantly intuitive rather than predominantly deliberative 
decisions and are vulnerable to the same types of decisionmaking 
errors. 
We conclude by arguing that our findings shed new light on 
executive branch justice. Among ALJs, executive branch agencies, 
and the scholars who study them, judicial independence has 
dominated discussion. We argue, instead, that the primary issue of 
concern is not judicial independence but judicial intuition. 
I.  INTUITIVE-OVERRIDE MODEL OF JUDGING 
Building on research from psychology as well as our own 
previous research on judicial decisionmaking, we contend that 
generalist judges approach legal problems using two distinct systems 
of judgment.10 On the one hand, judges, like other human beings, use 
 
and biases when making judgments); Andrew J. Wistrich, Chris Guthrie & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, 
Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 
U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005) (reporting experimental evidence showing that judges have difficulty 
deliberately disregarding relevant but inadmissible evidence when making merits decisions). 
 9. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124 (1974) (introducing the concept of heuristics and biases). 
 10. See Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 6; Keith E. Stanovich & Richard F. West, 
Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 421, 436 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (“Although there are several two-process theories of 
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an intuitive system of judgment, which is made up of so-called 
“System 1” processes.11 System 1 processes are “automatic, heuristic-
based, and relatively undemanding of computational capacity.”12 In 
short, they are “spontaneous, intuitive, effortless, and fast.”13 When 
assessing legal problems, judges quickly develop an intuition or 
“hunch” about the right outcome.14 
On the other hand, judges, like other human beings, also use a 
deliberative system of judgment, which is made up of so-called 
“System 2” processes.15 System 2 processes require “effort, 
motivation, concentration, and the execution of learned rules.”16 In 
short, these processes are “deliberate, rule-governed, effortful, and 
slow.”17 This means that when judges confront legal problems, they 
are also able to analyze them in a more measured, deliberative, and 
rule-based way. 
Our intuitive-override model of judging asserts that these two 
systems interact in a fairly predictable way. Relying on a generic 
model of decisionmaking proposed by Professors Daniel Kahneman 
and Shane Frederick,18 we contend that judges initially make intuitive 
or System 1 judgments—which are effortless, fast, and often 
accurate—that they might override with deliberative or System 2 
processes—which are more time and labor intensive. As Kahneman 
and Frederick explain their model, “System 1 quickly proposes 
intuitive answers to judgment problems as they arise, and System 2 
monitors the quality of these proposals, which it may endorse, 
correct, or override. The judgments that are eventually expressed are 
 
reasoning that differ somewhat in their details, all agree on the general features of the two 
systems which, for simplicity, we label System 1 and System 2.”). 
 11. See Stanovich & West, supra note 10, at 436. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 10, at 49, 49. 
 14. See Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in 
Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 278 (1929). 
 15. See Stanovich & West, supra note 10, at 436 (“System 2 conjoins the various 
characteristics associated with controlled processing.”). 
 16. Shane Frederick, Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 25, 26 
(2005). 
 17. Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 13, at 49. 
 18. Id. at 51. 
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called intuitive if they retain the hypothesized initial proposal without 
much modification.”19 
The intuitive-override model means that judges often rely on 
simple heuristics, attend closely to various informational cues that can 
be misleading, and can be influenced by untoward psychological 
phenomena in their decisionmaking.20 But judges can sometimes 
override these misleading intuitive responses with a more deductive, 
deliberative decisionmaking approach.21 This combination of intuition 
and deliberative override makes judges efficient decisionmakers, but 
we have found evidence suggesting that generalist judges may over-
rely on their intuitive processes and under-use their deliberative 
faculties. 
We recognize, of course, that the intuitive and deliberative 
systems can, and do, interact in a variety of ways.22 We also recognize 
that the brain is not neatly divided into two systems—it contains 
many areas that seem to perform discrete functions that are all 
interconnected.23 The notion of two systems is perhaps better viewed 
as a metaphor, or organizing principle, than a hard-wired reality in 
the brain. In the main, however, we think that our proposed model 
captures judges’ basic approach to decisionmaking and offers a more 
realistic, though still tractable, account than those associated with 
formalism (that is, purely deductive decisionmaking) and realism 
(that is, intuitive rationalization). 
II.  INTUITION AND DELIBERATION IN  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 
Does the same model of judging apply to ALJs? We suspect that 
it does. ALJs possess educational and professional credentials 
comparable to those of generalist judges,24 and in the courtroom, they 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 33. 
 21. Id. at 3. 
 22. Id. at 8–9 (identifying various ways in which intuition and deliberation can interact in 
judgment and decisionmaking). 
 23. See Mark Lubell et al., Institutional Design Capitalizing on the Intuitive Nature of 
Decision Making, in BETTER THAN CONSCIOUS: DECISION MAKING, THE HUMAN MIND, AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONS 413, 414 (Christoph Engel & Wolf Singer eds., 2008) (“[T]he 
distinction between conscious and unconscious is a somewhat artificial construct. So, too, is the 
supposed ‘system 1’ versus ‘system 2’ distinction.” (citation omitted)). 
 24. Most ALJs, like most generalist judges, are lawyers, see, e.g., Skoler, supra note 4, at 36 
(“[Federal] ALJs must be lawyers.”), but some state ALJs are not, see, e.g., Yoder, supra note 1, 
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perform the same functions.25 That is, they “hear cases, find the facts, 
and apply the law.”26 But even if the ALJs rely upon the same 
combination of intuition and deliberation, several features of the 
unique role they play in the legal system might lead them to rely more 
heavily than ordinary judges on deliberation. First, because ALJs 
tend to specialize, they might develop the expertise to discern when it 
is important to override their intuition with deliberation. Second, 
because ALJs face greater scrutiny of their decisions than do their 
generalist counterparts, they might feel more accountable, and this 
accountability might lead to more deliberative decisionmaking. Third, 
this heightened scrutiny might give ALJs greater access to feedback, 
which might also facilitate more deliberative decisionmaking.27 
A. Expertise 
The most striking difference between most ALJs and most 
generalist judges is that ALJs almost always specialize.28 In the federal 
government and many state governments, ALJs work for a particular 
 
at 325 (“We come in all shapes and sizes[:] lawyers and non-lawyers, federal and state, central 
panels and agency employees.”). 
 25. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (“There can be little doubt that the role of 
the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is 
‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable 
to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the 
course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions.”); James E. Moliterno, The 
Administrative Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1196–97 (2006) 
(observing that ALJs “possess, of course, the fundamental core of the judicial definition, which, 
while nowhere given authoritatively, is by wide approval known to consist in the impartial 
adjudication of cases”). 
 26. Michael Asimow, The Administrative Judiciary: ALJ’s in Historical Perspective, 20 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 157, 157 (2000); see also R. Terrence Harders, Striking a 
Balance: Administrative Law Judge Independence and Accountability, J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. 
JUDGES, Spring 1999, at 1, 9 (“[T]hose who come before ALJs recognize that the deciding of 
disputes, the prescribing of duties, and the recognition of entitlement affects them in much the 
same way that litigation plays out in courts of law.”). 
 27. Although we focus on potential advantages that ALJs possess, we acknowledge that 
ALJs might face potential disadvantages as well. For example, ALJs frequently face crowded 
dockets and often have fewer resources, such as judicial clerks, than many of their generalist 
counterparts. This might make them more, not less, prone to making snap, routinized, 
bureaucratic judgments. See Koch, supra note 3, at 693 (“Administrative agencies adjudicate 
massive numbers of individual disputes, far exceeding the number resolved by courts.”). 
 28. We recognize that a meaningful fraction of judicial branch judges serve on specialized 
courts, but most judicial branch judges are generalists. See generally CENT. EUROPEAN & 
EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE, AM. BAR ASS’N, SPECIALIZED COURTS: A CONCEPT PAPER 
(1996) (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (providing background on the composition of the 
U.S. specialized courts). 
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agency, like the Social Security Administration or the Department of 
Labor.29 Before ascending to the bench, they often have relevant 
expertise and practice experience.30 Once they become ALJs, their 
expertise in the subject matter of the agency deepens because most of 
them adjudicate disputes involving only the agency for which they 
 
 29. See L. Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J. COMP. LAW 
523, 535 (1990) (“Most ALJs specialize in adjudicating cases for only one agency . . . .”). This is 
uniformly true in the federal government because there all federal ALJs are employed by a 
particular agency. In the states, the employment arrangements of ALJs are more complicated 
and less amenable to “scholarly generalizations.” Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State 
Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 553 (2001); see also 
Skoler, supra note 4, at 35 (“Writing about administrative law judges at both federal and state 
levels is a tricky business and therefore rarely done.”). Historically, most state ALJs, like their 
federal counterparts, worked for specific agencies. See, e.g., James F. Flanagan, Redefining the 
Role of the State Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ 
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1357 (2002) [hereinafter 
Flanagan, Redefining the Role] (observing that California created the first central panel in 1945 
and that seven states had central panels by 1983). Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, many more 
states—now about thirty of them—moved to adopt, in various forms, “central panels” or 
independent ALJ agencies. See, e.g., James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in Central 
Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401, 403–04 (2005) [hereinafter 
Flanagan, Update on Developments] (“Twenty-five states, and three major cities, have 
established central panels thus far.”); Rossi, supra, at 568 (“In more than thirty states, to one 
degree or another administrative law judges (ALJs) are housed in a central panel . . . .”); Nat’l 
Ass’n of Admin. Law Judiciary, Non-Central Panel States, http://www.naalj.org/nonpanel.html 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2009) (identifying 29 states with central panels). Professor James Flanagan 
describes these central panel arrangements as follows: 
A central panel of ALJs is a cadre of professional adjudicators who are 
administratively independent of the agencies whose cases they hear, and thus, they 
are removed from agency influence. The central panels are organized in several ways. 
In some states, the central panel is an independent agency within the executive 
branch. In others, the central panel is part of another agency for administrative 
support, but independent for all other purposes. A third variation puts the ALJs in a 
separate organization, but assigns each ALJ to a particular agency based upon 
expertise in the subject matter. 
Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra, at 1356; see also William R. Andersen, Judicial Review of 
State Administrative Action—Designing the Statutory Framework, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 523, 554–
57 (1992) (proposing three models of administrative adjudication). But see Koch, supra note 3, 
at 733 (“[P]anel judges, since they serve many agencies, are generalists and thus do not provide 
the expertise and experience inherent in the traditional scheme.”). At present , then, all federal 
ALJs and nearly half of the state ALJs work within one agency, and among those state ALJs 
who are employed by central panels, many of them also specialize in the law and policy of a 
particular agency. 
 30. See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 29, at 1406 (“States often require ALJs to 
have substantive knowledge or experience in the subject matter . . . .”); see also, e.g., N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 52:14F-12(a) (West 2001) (requiring that judges hired into the environmental unit have 
“special expertise” in environmental law); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2003.049(d) (Vernon 
2000) (requiring ALJs to have experience in utility law). 
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work, meaning that they hear similar matters over and over again.31 In 
contrast to federal district judges—who at any given time might be 
hearing diversity cases involving various states’ substantive laws, 
multiple criminal matters, and disputes filed under a wide variety of 
federal statutes—most ALJs repeatedly hear the same kinds of cases. 
We do not want to overstate the difference between ALJs and 
generalist judges.32 As our own data show,33 some of the ALJs hear 
many different kinds of cases, particularly those who serve on 
“central panels.” These ALJs may differ little from the trial judges 
who sit in their states’ court of general jurisdiction. Conversely, in 
some jurisdictions, state trial judges specialize, devoting themselves to 
particular areas of law such as juvenile or family law. These state 
court judges may be no different from many of the ALJs who 
specialize in narrow areas of law. Nonetheless, specialization is the 
norm among ALJs but the exception among judicial branch trial 
judges. 
Because ALJs typically develop specialized expertise that their 
counterparts in the generalist judiciary do not possess, they might be 
better decisionmakers. Specialization does not always improve 
decisionmaking, however. Some research shows that greater expertise 
facilitates better judgment,34 but other research shows that generalists 
are just as competent as specialists.35 In one previous study, we found 
 
 31. This is so not only for the obvious reason that ALJs are repeatedly exposed to similar 
matters, but also because the agencies that employ them often provide the ALJs with important 
guidance to keep them abreast of relevant legal and policy developments. Flanagan, Redefining 
the Role, supra note 29, at 1406; see also, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.058(c) (providing 
a specific example requiring the agency to provide a statement on applicable rules and policies). 
 32. See Edward Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist Judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 540 (2008) 
(presenting evidence that generalist appellate judges tend to write opinions in various 
specialized areas). 
 33. See infra Part III.A. 
 34. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Panacea or Pandora’s Box?: The Costs of Options in 
Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641–42 (2003) (finding that lawyers were less susceptible than 
nonlawyers to the pernicious effects of contrast or asymmetric dominance); Chris Guthrie & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Insurers, Illusions of Judgment & Litigation, 59 VAND. L. REV. 2017, 2047 
(2006) (“This paper reports the results of several litigation problems—two anchoring problems, 
three framing problems, and one self-serving bias problem—involving nearly two hundred 
participants from the insurance industry. The results reported in the paper suggest that these 
experts, relative to others who have been studied, make decisions that more closely 
approximate rational choice.”); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and 
Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 99–101 (1997) (finding 
that lawyers are less susceptible than nonlawyers to framing effects). 
 35. SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 258 (1993) 
(“[S]everal studies have found that experts display either roughly the same biases as college 
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that federal bankruptcy judges appear as susceptible to common 
errors in judgment as their generalist counterparts,36 suggesting that 
specialization “does not lead inexorably to improved decision 
making.”37 Nonetheless, typical ALJs, even as compared to 
bankruptcy judges, tend to develop unusually high levels of 
specialized expertise and may therefore have much more familiarity 
with the matters they encounter in court. 
B. Accountability 
Even if specialization does not necessarily lead to better 
decisionmaking, ALJs might make more rational and deliberative 
decisions than their generalist-judge counterparts because they are 
more accountable for their decisions.38 In contrast to generalist judges, 
ALJs often do not make “final” decisions; instead, they issue 
recommended decisions that are reviewed by their agency heads.39 As 
 
students or the same biases at somewhat reduced levels.”); see also, e.g., John C. Anderson, D. 
Jordan Lowe & Philip M.J. Reckers, Evaluation of Auditor Decisions: Hindsight Bias Effects 
and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 725–31 (1993) (indicating that auditors, 
like nonexperts, are influenced by the hindsight bias); Hal R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the 
Hindsight Bias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305, 307 (1988) (demonstrating that psychologists, like 
nonexperts, are prone to the hindsight bias); Linda Babcock et al., Forming Beliefs About 
Adjudicated Outcomes: Perceptions of Risk and Reservation Values, 15 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
289, 296–97 (1995) (finding that framing effects similarly influenced lawyer and nonlawyer 
subjects); Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative Therapies, 
306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1261–62 (1982) (finding that physicians, like nonexperts, are 
susceptible to framing effects); Gregory B. Northcraft & Margaret A. Neale, Experts, Amateurs, 
and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions, 39 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 84, 94–96 (1987) (finding that real 
estate agents, like nonexperts, are influenced by anchoring effects when estimating real estate 
prices). 
 36. Rachlinski et al., supra note 7, at 1256 (“With regard to the two phenomena that we 
have tested in prior studies of generalist judges—anchoring and framing—the bankruptcy 
judges performed much like the generalist judges we have previously studied.”); see also 
Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 979, 983–85 (1994) (reporting evidence suggesting that bankruptcy judges are susceptible 
to self-serving or egocentric biases when making judgments). 
 37. Rachlinski et al., supra note 7, at 1257. 
 38. The argument developed here bears some relation to Mark Seidenfeld’s argument that 
accountability created by the prospect of judicial review might enhance agency decisionmaking. 
See Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency 
Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 509 (2002) (“Judicial review provides accountability, 
within the core psychological concept . . . .”); see also Mark Seidenfeld, The Psychology of 
Accountability and Political Review of Agency Rules, 51 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1061–68 (2001) 
(reviewing the psychological research on accountability). 
 39. According to James Flanagan, “the agency’s power to review the findings of the ALJ” 
is a “fundamental premise of administrative adjudication.” Flanagan, Update on Developments, 
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Professor James Moliterno observes, this review can be quite 
searching; none of an ALJ’s findings, including factual 
determinations, are binding on the agency because “[t]he agency is 
omnipotent when it comes to administrative judge decisions.”40 This 
means that ALJs are accountable to a superior—the agency head or 
the agency head’s designates, like the agency’s general counsel’s 
office—in a way that generalist judges are not. And on top of this, 
ALJs’ decisions, like the decisions of generalist judges, are also 
subject to judicial review in the courts. 
The ubiquitous accountability that ALJs face might enhance the 
quality of their decisionmaking because research shows that 
accountability often leads to better decisionmaking.41 When 
 
supra note 29, at 401; see also James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s Independence 
Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1224 (2006) (“[A]dministrative judges are crucially 
dependent, both in that their decisions often require executive affirmation and in that they are 
always subject to executive review . . . .”). 
This “fundamental premise” is embedded in the Administrative Procedure Act, which 
gave rise to the modern ALJ in federal agencies. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also Flanagan, 
Redefining the Role, supra note 29, at 1364. Moreover, the Model State Administrative 
Procedure Act adopted the federal standard in 1981, as did many of the administrative 
procedure acts in the states. Id. 
In recent years, some states—particularly those that have embraced a “central panel” 
system, see supra note 29, have moved to enhance the finality of ALJ decisions, see, e.g., 
Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 29, at 1373 (observing that “[a]t the beginning of the 
1990s, in almost all the states including those with central panels, the statutes permitted the 
agency to amend the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with relative ease,” but 
noting that this began to change in the early 1990s); Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: 
Balancing Independence with Accountability, J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES, Fall 1999, at 1, 
2 (“[F]ollowing the proliferation of central panels, many states have increasingly given ALJ 
orders de jure or de facto finality by taking away an agency’s opportunity to review ALJ 
decisions or requiring agencies to accept ALJ findings unless the agency overcomes a fairly 
rigorous evidentiary or reasoning burden.”). 
Despite this innovation in some states, ALJs, even those who preside in central panel 
states, are much less independent and much more accountable than their counterparts in the 
judicial branch, as Professor James Moliterno explains: 
[T]he central fact of review remains: central panel administrative judges’ decisions are 
also reviewed directly by agencies, often case-party agencies. This is the key fact that 
largely deprives administrative judges of the judicial independence trait. In reality, 
nothing is fundamentally changed with the institution of the central panel concept. 
The administrative judiciary simply becomes a judiciary within the executive 
branch/administrative state. This feature may further serve to insulate the 
administrative judge in an impartiality sense, but the administrative judge remains a 
member of the executive branch, fully subject to override by the agency. 
Moliterno, supra, at 1233. 
 40. Moliterno, supra note 39, at 1225. 
 41. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 260–62 tbl.1 (1999) (documenting the extensive 
literature on accountability). 
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decisionmakers know the views of the parties to whom they are 
accountable, they generally anticipate and adopt those views.42 This 
suggests that when ALJs know how their agency head would decide 
the case before them, they are likely to decide in the manner that they 
believe their agency head would decide, hewing closely to the 
agency’s interpretation of its governing law. When decisionmakers do 
not know the views of the parties to whom they are accountable, they 
are more likely to engage in “self-critical” and “effortful” processing, 
often leading to improved decisionmaking.43 This suggests that when 
ALJs know their decisions will be reviewed, but are uncertain how 
their agency head would decide the case, they will exert more effort 
and care than is customary, perhaps leading to more rational and 
deliberative decisionmaking. In either case, then, there is reason to 
believe that ALJs, at least relative to their counterparts in the 
judiciary, might make better decisions because they have a higher 
degree of accountability.44 
As with expertise, the apparent difference in accountability 
between ALJs and generalist judges is easy to overstate. For example, 
both generalist judges and ALJs are similarly accountable in the sense 
that both offices tend to carry a high degree of job security. ALJs are 
certainly less secure than Federal District Judges, but they are apt to 
have more job security than state judges and are likely to have some 
 
 42. See, e.g., Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 41, at 256 (“When audience views are known 
prior to forming one’s own opinion, conformity becomes the likely coping strategy. People can 
simply adopt positions likely to gain the favor of those to whom they are accountable, thereby 
allowing them to avoid the unnecessary cognitive work of analyzing the pros and cons of 
alternative courses of action, interpreting complex patterns of information, and making difficult 
trade-offs.” (citations omitted)); Philip E. Tetlock, The Impact of Accountability on Judgment 
and Choice: Toward a Social Contingency Model, 25 ADV. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 331, 
340–41 (1992) (observing that when people know the views of those to whom they are 
accountable, they frequently adopt those views). 
 43. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 41, at 259, 260–62 tbl.1 (describing this phenomenon and 
identifying the decision heuristics and biases that are attenuated, as well as a small number that 
are actually amplified, by this form of accountability); see also Tetlock, supra note 42, at 343 
(“Predecisional accountability to unknown audiences frequently motivates vigilant, complex, 
and self-critical thinking.”). For refinements, see Itamar Simonson & Peter Nye, The Effect of 
Accountability on Susceptibility to Decision Errors, 51 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN 
DECISION PROCESSES 416, 437 (1992). “[A]ccountability is expected to reduce errors if decision 
makers can identify the response that would be regarded as more rational, but that response is 
different from the one that unaccountable decision makers tend to make.” Id. 
 44. For the argument that any behavioral analysis of legal decisionmaking should consider 
the potential impact of accountability on the decisionmaker, see Gregory Mitchell, Why Law 
and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ 
Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67, 110–14 (2002). 
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measure of civil service protection or the like. Job security is 
obviously one important aspect of accountability, but it is not what we 
are focusing on here. The psychological evidence on accountability 
suggests that scrutiny of individual decisions by superiors, as opposed 
to lengthy performance reviews, can reduce reliance on intuitive 
judgment. It is in this sense that the ALJs are somewhat more 
accountable than generalist trial judges. Many of their decisions are 
merely recommendations to agencies, which may or may not be 
adopted.45 To be sure, in some cases, these recommendations are 
adopted with sufficient frequency that they might as well be final 
orders, but even if an ALJ’s recommendations as to a final order are 
accepted, they are still subject to review by a trial or appellate court, 
meaning that ALJs are subject to at least one additional layer of 
review that trial judges are not. Therefore, ALJs, particularly those 
who issue only recommendations, make decisions that are more apt 
to be scrutinized in the way that psychologists contend might reduce 
reliance on intuitive processing.46 
C. Feedback 
The third reason we expected to find that ALJs might make 
more rational and deliberative decisions is a consequence of the 
second. Because ALJs are subject to review by the agencies that 
employ them (as well as by the courts in those cases subject to judicial 
review), they receive much more feedback on the accuracy of their 
 
 45. For example, ALJs in Oregon might face the same degree of scrutiny as the trial court: 
Ninety eight percent of the OAH’s orders are final orders. These orders generally 
cannot be changed by agencies after ALJs issue them. They are appealable to a 
circuit court or the Court of Appeals (unemployment insurance decisions are 
appealable to the Employment Appeals Board). The remaining OAH orders are 
proposed orders. Proposed orders are decisions recommended to agencies by ALJs 
based on their review of the facts and law. Agencies are not required to accept the 
recommendations. However, if they do not, they are required to explain the reason 
for all “substantial” changes. If findings of fact are changed, they must show how 
most of the evidence at hearing supports their version of the facts; on appeal to the 
Court of Appeals, the Court can look at the entire record and determine 
independently (de novo) whether it agrees with the agency’s version. 
Office of Admin. Hearings, The OAH, http://www.oregon.gov/OAH/The_OAH2.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 46. The fact that some ALJs make only recommended decisions might encourage reliance 
on intuitive processes. Knowing that a decision might be reviewed by an agency head could lead 
to a diffusion of responsibility so that ALJs worry less about the accuracy of their decisions. 
Although this is possible, we doubt it. We suspect that ALJs, like most judges, take their 
positions very seriously and use whatever resources and information that they have available to 
try to make sound judgments. 
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decisions than does a typical judicial-branch judge. In contrast to 
generalist judges, who face appellate review in only a very small 
number of cases47 and on limited bases,48 ALJs receive review much 
more commonly. Some ALJs only make recommendations to 
agencies, which might mean that they receive feedback in virtually 
every case. In the large majority of cases in which agencies embrace 
the ALJs’ decisions,49 the ALJs learn that their decisions were 
accurate, at least from the perspective of the agency employing 
them.50 And in the cases in which the agency rejects their decisions, 
the ALJs receive immediate feedback regarding the flaws in their 
decisionmaking, at least from the perspective of the agency. 
Furthermore, some agencies conduct routine audits of ALJ decisions, 
producing a kind of report card for each judge.51 
Psychologists have found that feedback—if it is provided 
promptly and offers meaningful insight into the causes and 
consequences of decisionmaking flaws—can improve 
decisionmaking.52 This is precisely the kind of feedback that ALJs, in 
 
 47. See, e.g., C.K. ROWLAND & ROBERT A. CARP, POLITICS AND JUDGMENT IN FEDERAL 
DISTRICT COURTS 8 (1996) (“[O]nly about 20 percent of all district court cases are appealed in 
any given year.”); Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried 
Cases: Further Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
659, 685 (2004) (“About 20 percent of cases with definitive trial court judgments generate 
appeals, with tried cases appealed at about twice the rate of nontried cases.”). 
 48. See, e.g., ROWLAND & CARP, supra note 47, at 9 (observing that interpretations of fact 
are free from review); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 161, 162 (2001); Maurice Rosenberg, Standards of Review, in RESTRUCTURING JUSTICE: 
THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 30, 31 
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990) (explaining bases of review). 
 49. See, e.g., Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and Courts: 
An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1616 (2001) (reporting, based on 
an empirical examination of ALJ decisionmaking in North Carolina, that agencies fully adopted 
82 percent and partially adopted 6 percent of the decisions recommended by their ALJs). 
 50. We do not address the issue of political conflicts between the ALJs and the agency. An 
ALJ could interpret the law and facts perfectly well, but face an agency bent on moving the law 
in a new direction, or implementing a new policy. Although such conflicts would produce 
reversals of the ALJ, they are not really errors. 
 51. The Social Security Administration, for example, conducts these kinds of audits. U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SSA DISABILITY DECISION MAKING: ADDITIONAL STEPS 
NEEDED TO ENSURE ACCURACY AND FAIRNESS OF DECISIONS AT THE HEARINGS LEVEL 9 
(2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0414.pdf (describing the SSA’s Office of 
Quality Assurance and Performance Assessment’s process for conducting quality assurance 
reviews of a random sample of ALJ decisions). This is similar to the peer review we 
recommended in a previous paper. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 39. 
 52. See, e.g., ROBIN M. HOGARTH, EDUCATING INTUITION 88–90 (2001) (distinguishing 
“kind” environments, which provide valuable feedback and in turn can improve intuitions, from 
“wicked” environments, which do not). 
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contrast to generalist trial judges, typically receive. The availability of 
this kind of feedback thus provides yet another reason to be 
optimistic about the quality of ALJ decisionmaking. 
To be sure, if the decisions ALJs make are adopted routinely, 
they will not receive much better feedback than trial judges.53 Also, 
the feedback that agencies give to ALJs might be unclear or muted. 
But the average ALJ will tend to get more feedback from a reviewing 
agency (and subsequent judicial review) than the average trial judge 
will. Whether such feedback is sufficient to induce ALJs to rely less 
on intuition is unclear. 
D. Summary 
ALJs enjoy some potential advantages over generalist trial 
judges that might enable them to make more rational decisions. They 
often specialize in limited areas of law, their decisions are more apt to 
be scrutinized on review, and they receive more frequent and prompt 
feedback. For these three reasons—specialization, accountability, and 
feedback—we hypothesized that ALJs might make predominantly 
rational and deliberative, rather than predominantly intuitive and 
impulsive, decisions.54 
III.  STUDYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
We have reported evidence in our prior work that supports our 
intuitive-override model of judging.55 That work, however, is based on 
 
 53. Adoption rates vary. In Oregon, adoption rates exceed 98 percent in many categories 
of cases. See Office of Admin. Hearings, supra note 45. Arizona reports that adoption rates of 
ALJ decisions are over 85 percent. OFFICE OF ADMIN. HEARINGS, THIRTEENTH ANNUAL 
REPORT 1 (2008), available at http://www.azoah.com/13thAnnualReport.pdf (reporting that the 
Arizona agency acceptance of central panel ALJs’ findings of fact and conclusions of law 
without modification was 92.6 percent, and that the overall rate of adoption of entire ALJ 
decisions (that is, including the remedy portion of the recommendation) without modification 
was 86.64 percent). 
 54. We recognize, of course, that some previous empirical studies of ALJs suggest that they 
are not ideal decisionmakers. Some ALJs have been shown to produce decisions that vary by 
the race of the litigants, see Stephen Labaton, Benefits Are Refused More Often to Disabled 
Blacks, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at A1 (summarizing a 1992 study by the General 
Accounting Office and reporting that “[f]or 30 years, blacks with serious ailments have been 
much more likely than whites to be rejected for benefits under Social Security disability 
programs”), and others have been shown to be wildly erratic, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew 
I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) (reporting “amazing disparities” in asylum grant rates among 
immigration judges). 
 55. See sources cited supra note 8. 
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evidence gathered from trial judges who are generalists (and, in one 
instance, from a sample of federal bankruptcy judges). The purpose 
of this Article is to explore whether this model also captures the way 
ALJs appear to make decisions. Because they are similar to generalist 
judges in education, experience, and role, it seems likely that ALJs 
would behave in much the same way as generalist judges. On the 
other hand, as explained above, ALJs might have some 
decisionmaking advantages, given their subject-matter expertise, 
accountability to agency superiors, and more frequent receipt of 
timely feedback. 
To explore ALJ decisionmaking, we conducted two lines of 
investigation. First, we explored whether ALJs appear more inclined 
toward intuition or deliberation when responding to a set of generic 
problems that make up the “Cognitive Reflection Test” (CRT).56 
Second, we asked ALJs to respond to a series of hypothetical, 
judicial-decisionmaking problems in which we explored whether 
different variables triggered intuitive decisionmaking. In this Part, we 
explain our methods and then present our results. 
A. Methods 
To explore ALJ decisionmaking, we gave questionnaires to two 
groups of ALJs attending judicial education conferences at which we 
appeared as speakers. The first group, which consisted of thirty-nine 
ALJs, attended the City of New York Administrative Judicial 
Institute in New York City in June of 2008 (the “city conference”). 
The second group, which consisted of 103 ALJs, attended the 
National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 2008 Annual 
Conference in New York City in October of 2008 (the “national 
conference”). 
Among the ALJs who attended the city conference, twenty-two 
were men and seventeen were women. They had an average of 10.1 
years of experience, with a range of zero to twenty-nine years. In 
response to a question concerning their affiliation with a political 
party, thirty-one identified themselves as Democrats, three as 
Republicans, and five declined to answer this question. Among the 
ALJs who attended the national conference, forty were men, fifty-
seven were women, and six declined to disclose their gender. These 
judges had an average of 10.8 years of experience, with a range of 
 
 56. See infra Part II.B. 
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zero to thirty-one years’ experience. They also identified mostly as 
Democrats (seventy-six), as opposed to Republicans (eleven), 
although sixteen did not respond to this question. 
The judges in the study had a vast and varied range of judicial 
experience and expertise. We asked the judges to identify “what type 
of cases you normally hear.” The ALJs who attended the city 
conference gave the following responses: employee discipline, 
including police matters (nine judges); administrative code violations 
(six judges); environmental control (five judges); health, safety, 
building code (five judges), special education (five judges); traffic and 
parking (four judges); vehicle forfeiture (four judges); discrimination 
claims (two judges); Section 8 (housing) claims (two judges); taxi and 
limousine commission (two judges); and one judge each in contract 
cases, licensing, sanitation, tax, department of transportation (which 
might have been taxi and limo), and zoning.57 
The ALJs who attended the national conference included an 
even more diverse array of judges. These judges traveled to the 
conference from fourteen states: New York (forty-seven judges); 
District of Columbia (nine judges); California (four judges); Georgia 
(seven judges); Illinois (two judges); Iowa (two judges); Kentucky 
(one judge); Maryland (five judges); North Carolina (two judges); 
South Carolina (one judge); Texas (two judges); Vermont (one 
judge); Washington (two judges); West Virginia (two judges). In 
addition, we had two ALJs from Quebec and one federal magistrate 
judge. These ALJs reported presiding over a wide range of cases as 
well: employment, including unemployment insurance (seven judges); 
professional licensing (seven judges); worker’s compensation (seven 
judges); special education (six judges); housing (section 8 and rent 
control) (six judges); environmental (six judges); traffic (including 
parking and DUI) (five judges); antidiscrimination (or human rights) 
(four judges); health code (four judges); medical/healthcare 
(including Medicare) (four judges); consumer protection (four 
judges); public works (three judges); building permits (two judges); 
labor standards (two judges); child abuse/foster care (two judges); 
campaign finance (two judges); parole violations (two judges); 
disability (two judges); and one judge each in insurance, immigration, 
tax, liquor, securities, forfeiture, and taxi and limousine. Additionally, 
twenty-one judges indicated that they were part of the state’s “central 
 
 57. Note that some of the judges identified more than one type of case in response to this 
question. 
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panel” and hence were available for all kinds of cases. Another 
eleven did not respond to this question. 
We also asked this group of judges to identify how their decisions 
are reviewed. Specifically, we asked whether they make 
“recommendations that are either adopted, rejected, or modified by 
an agency” or whether their decisions are simply subject to review by 
an agency or a court. Of the ninety-four judges who answered the 
question, 44.7 percent (forty-two judges) indicated that they make 
recommendations, 39.3 percent (thirty-seven judges) indicated that 
they make decisions that are subject to review by an agency, and 51.1 
percent (forty-eight judges) reported making decisions that are 
subject to review by a court. As the numbers indicate, some of the 
judges checked more than one box: two checked both 
recommendation and review by agency; three checked 
recommendation and review by court; eight checked both review by 
agency and review by court; and ten checked all three. To facilitate 
some of our analyses, we divide the judges into the 44.7 percent who 
indicated that they make recommendations in at least some instances 
and the 55.3 percent who are only subject to review by either an 
agency or a court.58 
We followed the same procedure at both conferences. Before 
beginning our formal presentation, we randomly distributed 
questionnaires to the ALJs in person. We asked the ALJs to read and 
respond to each of the questions and to provide some basic 
demographic information. All of the questionnaires included the 
CRT as well as a variety of problems designed to test judicial 
decisionmaking.59 We informed the ALJs that participation was 
entirely voluntary, that they could continue or cease participating at 
any time, and that their responses would be anonymous. We also gave 
the ALJs at each conference the opportunity to limit our use of their 
results to the conference itself. None of the ALJs at the city 
conference did this, but four of the judges at the national conference 
exercised this option, and their results are excluded from our analysis. 
 
 58. We do not have this data available for the city conference judges (although most are in 
the third category), so we do not categorize them in this way or include them in specialized 
analyses that distinguish the ALJs from one another based on the type of review to which their 
decisions are (or are not) subjected. 
 59. Copies of the original versions of these problems are included in Appendices A and B, 
along with a copy of the questions that elicited demographic information about the judges. 
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B. Results: Cognitive Reflection 
We first explored whether ALJs, like generalist trial judges, solve 
generic problems in an intuitive or deliberative way. To do so, we 
gave the ALJs the CRT.60 
1. Cognitive Reflection Test.  Created by Frederick, the CRT is a 
simple, three-item test designed to distinguish intuitive and 
impressionistic processing from deliberative and deductive 
processing.61 More specifically, the CRT measures “cognitive 
reflection,” which is “the ability or disposition to resist reporting the 
response that first comes to mind.”62 
The CRT is printed below, as Figure 1. Each of the three CRT 
items has an intuitive answer that almost immediately comes to mind, 
but the intuitive answer is wrong. The correct answer is fairly easy to 
determine, but ascertaining it requires deliberation. As Frederick 
explains, the CRT items are simple because “their solution is easily 
underst[andable] when explained, yet reaching the correct answer 
often requires the suppression of an erroneous answer that springs 
‘impulsively’ to mind.”63 
Figure 1. Cognitive Reflection Test64 
By way of illustration, consider the “bat-and-ball” problem, 
which is the first problem in Figure 1. When asked to solve this 
problem, most people immediately report “ten cents” as their 
 
 60. Frederick, supra note 16, at 26–28. 
 61. Id. at 27. 
 62. Id. at 35. 
 63. Id. at 27. 
 64. Researchers utilized the same three questions in Frederick’s study. Id. 
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost? 
  _____cents 
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it 
take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? 
  _____minutes 
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles 
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
  _____day 
RACHLINSKI IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:08:30 PM 
1496 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1477 
answer.65 Although this response is intuitive, and although it seems as 
though it must be correct, a little deliberation reveals that it is 
inaccurate. If the ball costs ten cents, as most people think when they 
first encounter the problem, and the bat costs one dollar more, as the 
problem specifies, the bat must cost $1.10. This means that the total 
cost of the bat and ball is $1.20 rather than $1.10 as specified by the 
problem. The correct answer is five cents—that is, the ball costs five 
cents, the bat costs $1.00 more or $1.05, and the two together cost 
$1.10, as required by the problem. It is an easy problem, but to get the 
right answer, respondents have to ignore the initial, intuitive, 
incorrect answer that occurs to them and think through the problem 
in a deliberative way. 
This is true for the second CRT problem—the “widget” 
problem—as well. On this problem, the answer that comes 
immediately to mind for most people is one hundred minutes.66 The 
correct answer, however, is five minutes. If, as the problem specifies, 
five machines make five widgets in five minutes, it takes each 
machine five minutes to make a widget. Thus, one hundred machines 
would make one hundred widgets in five minutes (and five hundred 
machines would make five hundred widgets in five minutes, one 
thousand machines would make one thousand widgets in five 
minutes, etc.).67 
The third problem—the “lily-pad” problem—also invites an 
intuitive and inaccurate response. For most people, the answer that 
immediately comes to mind is twenty-four days.68 The correct answer 
on this problem, as on the others, is obvious upon reflection. If, as the 
problem specifies, the patch of lily pads doubles each day and covers 
the entire lake on the forty-eighth day, it must cover half of the lake a 
day earlier. This means that the correct answer is forty-seven days, 
not twenty-four days. 
For those who suppress their impulsive responses and deliberate, 
the CRT items are simple and straightforward. Most people are 
unable, or perhaps unwilling, to overcome their impulsive reactions to 
the problems. In thirty-five studies involving thousands of 
 
 65. Id. at 26–27. 
 66. Id. at 27. 
 67. As we have noted elsewhere, see Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 11 n.57, this 
problem assumes that each machine produces widgets at the same rate, which seems a 
reasonable assumption given the structure of the problem and of the CRT as a whole. 
 68. Frederick, supra note 16, at 27. 
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respondents, Frederick found that subjects correctly answered, on 
average, only 1.24 of the three items.69 Among all of the participants 
in Frederick’s studies, only 17 percent answered all three questions 
correctly; roughly twice that many (33 percent) got all three problems 
wrong.70 
The CRT illustrates the predominance of intuitive over 
deliberative processing in three ways. First, most people perform 
poorly on the CRT, even though the problems are simple if 
approached deliberatively.71 Ironically, people tend to perform better 
on similar but harder problems that signal that deliberation is 
required.72 Frederick explains, for example, that people “miss the ‘bat 
and ball’ problem far more often than they miss the ‘banana and 
bagel’ problem: ‘A banana and a bagel cost 37 cents. The banana 
costs 13 cents more than the bagel. How much does the bagel cost?’”73 
Second, among the infinite number of potential inaccurate 
responses to each of the CRT problems, the intuitive answers 
identified above—ten cents in the bat-and-ball problem, one hundred 
minutes in the widget problem, and twenty-four days on the lily-pad 
problem—are the most commonly offered responses.74 
Third, and perhaps most impressively, subjects who select the 
inaccurate, intuitive response are more likely than subjects who 
answer the problems correctly to indicate that the problems are 
easy.75 In his administration of the bat-and-ball problem, for example, 
Frederick found that subjects who provided the intuitive, but 
inaccurate, response—that is, ten cents—predicted that 92 percent of 
people would solve the problem correctly because it seemed quite 
easy to them. Among the subjects who actually provided the correct 
answer, however, only 62 percent predicted that other people would 
solve the problem correctly.76 Having suppressed their intuitive 
 
 69. Id. at 28, 29 tbl.1. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 27. 
 72. Id. at 28. 
 73. Id. In contrast to the bat-and-ball problem, the banana-and-bagel problem does not 
suggest an intuitive response. Accordingly, most people attempt to solve the problem 
deliberatively by explicitly or implicitly using algebra—i.e., x = bagel, y = banana, y = x + 13, so 
x + x + 13 = 37. Solving for x, x = 12 and y = 25. 
 74. Id. at 27. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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reaction in favor of deliberation, they appreciated that the problem, 
though simple if one deliberated, was actually tricky. 
Although the CRT correlates with standard assessments of 
intelligence,77 it does measure what an IQ test measures. Rather, it 
tests a respondent’s ability to suppress intuition in favor of 
deliberation in a setting where intuition is misleading.78 This is why we 
find it to be of interest for judges, who must commonly suppress their 
intuition in favor of following a deliberative decisionmaking process. 
Furthermore, people who score well on the CRT also appear to resist 
falling prey to a range of common cognitive errors in judgment, 
including the conjunction fallacy, imperfect Bayesian reasoning, 
overconfidence, hyperbolic discounting, and risk preferences resulting 
from framing effects.79 Many of these errors can influence judgments 
in legal contexts, and we have found that generalist judges are 
vulnerable to some of them. The CRT might be able to identify 
judges who suppress the intuitive processes that can produce these 
errors and rely instead on deliberative processes. 
2. CRT and ALJs.  Curious about how generalist judges would 
respond to the cognitive reflection test, we gave it to nearly half of the 
sitting trial judges in Florida at a judicial education conference. The 
judges obtained an average score of 1.23,80 slightly higher than the 
average score of students at the University of Michigan (1.18) and 
slightly lower than the average score of students at Harvard (1.43).81 
Like other subjects, the generalist judges tended to select the 
intuitive, but incorrect, answer on the problems,82 and like other 
subjects, the judges who did so tended to think that the problems 
were easier than did those judges who answered the problems 
correctly.83 
The results seem predictable—judges performed about as well as 
the most educated adults on the CRT. The results were not 
foreordained, however. Judges spend an enormous amount of time 
 
 77. Id. at 35. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Jorg Oechssler, Andreas Roider & Patrick W. Schmitz, Cognitive Abilities and 
Behavioral Biases 4–6 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 3481, 2008), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1294555. 
 80. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 14. 
 81. Frederick, supra note 16, at 29 tbl.1. 
 82. Guthrie et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 16. 
 83. Id. 
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sorting through and applying rules that might conflict with their 
intuitive responses. As Table 1 indicates, undergraduates at MIT, who 
largely specialize in math, engineering, and science, perform much 
better on the CRT. The sense that intuition should be ignored, or at 
least checked by logic or computation, is well developed in such 
professions, and it shows on the CRT results. And that is all to the 
good. No one wants to drive over a bridge that was designed by a civil 
engineer who relied on intuition as to whether it had enough 
structural support; we want someone who did the math. Similarly, we 
might want judges who have habits of mind that lead them to check 
their intuitive responses with deliberation, but this is not what we 
found among generalist judges on the CRT. 
ALJs might be different, as we have discussed. To see how the 
ALJs would perform on the CRT, we gave the CRT to both samples 
of ALJs. We excluded the three judges from the city conference and 
the thirteen judges from the national conference who did not 
complete all three questions.84 Among the remaining judges, the city 
conference attendees obtained an average score of 1.50, and the ALJs 
at the national conference obtained an average score of 1.27.85 
Collectively, the ALJs obtained an average score of 1.33, which is 
roughly comparable to the score obtained by the Florida state trial 
judges.86 Overall, 30.2 percent provided incorrect answers on all three 
items; 27.8 percent answered one item correctly; 20.6 percent 
answered two items correctly; and 21.4 percent got all answered all 
three items correctly. Among those who provided inaccurate 
responses, the most commonly offered responses on the CRT 
problems were the intuitive but inaccurate responses suggested by the 
problem. On the bat-and-ball problem, for example, 93.7 percent of 
 
 84. Among these sixteen judges, five answered none of the questions; four answered both 
of the first two questions with the intuitive (but wrong) answer, and did not answer the third 
question; one answered the first question with the correct answer, the second question with the 
intuitive (but wrong) answer, and did not answer the third question; one answered the first 
question with the intuitive (but wrong) answer and did not respond to the second or third 
questions; one answered the first question with the intuitive answer and the second question with 
a wrong (but not the intuitive) answer, and did not respond to the third question; one answered 
the first question with the intuitive but incorrect answer, the second question with the correct 
answer, and did not respond to the third question; three answered the first question with the 
intuitive (but wrong) answer, skipped the second question, and answered the third question with 
the correct answer. 
 85. An ordered logit regression revealed that the two groups did not differ significantly. 
z = 1.08, p = .28. 
 86. An ordered logit regression revealed that the ALJs did not perform significantly 
differently than the Florida trial judges. z = .80, p = .45. 
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those who responded inaccurately gave the intuitive response 
suggested by that problem; on the widget problem, 52.7 percent of 
those who got the question wrong gave the intuitive but inaccurate 
response; and on the lily-pad problem, 64.9 percent of those who got 
the question wrong gave the intuitive but inaccurate response. As 
depicted in Table 1, the ALJs performed much like trial judges and 
many college students. 
Table 1. Overall CRT Results: Judges and Selected Others87 










MIT (61) 2.18 7 16 30 48 
Carnegie Mellon (746) 1.51 25 25 25 25 
Harvard (51) 1.43 20 37 24 20 
ALJs (126) 1.33 30 28 21 21 
Florida Judges (252) 1.23 31 31 24 15 
Michigan/Ann Arbor (525) 1.18 31 33 23 14 
Bowling Green (52)  .87 50 25 21 6 
Michigan State (118)  .79 49 29 16 6 
Toledo (138)  .57 64 21 10 5 
The ALJs, like the other respondents, provided predominantly 
intuitive responses to the CRT items, though most of them 
demonstrated that they could override their intuition in at least some 
circumstances. Nonetheless, the CRT results show that ALJs, like 
generalist judges, gravitate toward intuitive rather than deliberative 
processing.88 
 
 87. All of the nonjudge data on this table were collected on college students, and comes 
from Frederick, supra note 16, at 29 tbl.1. The data from the Florida Judges come from Guthrie 
et al., Blinking, supra note 8, at 15 tbl.2. Note that the table in our previous article mistakenly 
reports the sample size as 192 rather than 252. 
 88. Previous research with other populations shows that men perform slightly better than 
women on the CRT. Frederick, supra note 16, at 37–38, 38 tbl.6 (showing male subjects with a 
mean sore of 1.47 and female subjects with a mean score of 1.08). We did not find this to be the 
case with the Florida trial judges in our previous work, but we did see differences among the 
ALJs. The fifty-eight male judges who both completed the CRT and identified their gender 
scored an average of 1.52, whereas the sixty-six women judges scored an average of 1.17. This 
difference was marginally significant, per an ordered logit regression, revealing z =1.80, p=.07.  
The average CRT scores among the thirty-seven judges in the national conference sample 
who make recommendations and completed the CRT was 1.30, as compared to 1.20 among the 
forty-nine judges who are only subject to review; this was not a significant difference. The 
analysis was done with an ordered logit regression, revealing z =.37, p=.72. This last result is 
perhaps no surprise, but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that judges who make 
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C. Results: Judicial Decisionmaking 
The CRT results suggest that ALJs, like their colleagues on 
generalist courts, tend to make ordinary judgments in a 
predominantly intuitive way. Although suggestive, these results do 
not necessarily reveal how ALJs make judgments on the bench. To 
explore whether ALJs make intuitive judgments not only when faced 
with mathematically oriented word problems, but also when 
confronted with the kinds of judgment tasks they face on the job, we 
gave the ALJs who participated in our studies several judicial-
decisionmaking problems. More specifically, we tested for 
susceptibility to six well-known psychological phenomena that are 
likely to trigger intuitive thinking: anchoring, framing, conjunction 
fallacy, outcome bias, disregarding, and egocentric bias. We found 
that ALJs, like generalist judges, are often, though not always, 
influenced by these phenomena. Our results support our conclusion 
that ALJs, like generalist trial judges, approach legal problems in a 
predominantly intuitive, though occasionally deliberative, way. 
1. Anchoring.  When people make numerical estimates, they tend 
to rely heavily on the first number available to them. The initial 
number, in other words, provides an “anchor” that exerts 
disproportionate influence on the estimation process.89 Psychologists 
have found, for example, that subjects provided higher estimates of 
the average temperature in San Francisco if first asked to indicate 
whether it was higher or lower than 558 degrees, and provided higher 
estimates of the average price of a college textbook if first asked 
whether the average price was higher or lower than $7,128.53.90 
Psychologists refer to this phenomenon as “anchoring.”91 
Anchoring may be ameliorated by accountability. In research on 
anchoring, psychologist Phil Tetlock has found that anchoring has less 
influence on people when they learn they must explain their estimates 
and that their explanations will be held up for public scrutiny.92 This 
 
recommendations develop radically different habits of mind that lead them to engage in 
deliberative thinking across the board. 
 89. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 1128 (“[D]ifferent starting points yield 
different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.”). 
 90. PLOUS, supra note 35, at 146 (reporting the results of an unpublished study conducted 
by George Quattrone and his colleagues). 
 91. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 9, at 1128 (introducing the phenomenon). 
 92. See Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 41, at 262–63 (“Moreover, two especially pervasive 
tendencies, (a) anchoring on an initial value and insufficiently adjusting a numerical estimate up 
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manipulation mimics the conditions under which judges sometimes 
operate, yet we have found that anchors influence the judgments of 
generalist trial judges in legal settings.93 Specifically, we have found 
that anchors influence estimates of damage awards by trial judges.94 
We have found this effect even when the anchors were clearly 
irrelevant and clearly inadmissible.95 Because ALJs are accustomed to 
review, and because their decisions are commonly afforded less 
deference than those of trial judges, they might be less susceptible to 
anchoring than their counterparts in the judicial branch. 
To explore whether anchoring influences ALJs, we gave the 
ALJs who attended the national conference a problem we called 
“Veronica v. AAC.” We asked the ALJs participating in our study to 
imagine that they were presiding over an employment discrimination 
case brought by the City Commission on Human Rights on behalf of 
Veronica Sanchez against a company called Administrative Assistants 
on Call (AAC). In the suit, the ALJs learn, the Commission alleges 
that AAC violated the administrative code by terminating Veronica, 
a Mexican-American immigrant, on the basis of her “actual or 
perceived” race, color, national origin, and citizenship status. 
Veronica had been a top employee at AAC, a company that 
provides off-site secretarial services to small businesses, until a new 
manager arrived. The new manager allegedly assigned her solely to 
undesirable projects; used racially offensive terms in her presence; 
told her to “go back to Mexico”; and accused her of stealing work 
from “real Americans.” On one occasion, he made these comments in 
front of Veronica’s daughter, who was visiting her at work, and in 
front of one of Veronica’s coworkers, who corroborated Veronica’s 
testimony. Veronica complained, and the manager proceeded to fire 
her. 
AAC does not deny Veronica’s allegations, but it challenges the 
Commission’s request for compensatory damages on Veronica’s 
behalf because Veronica found comparable work immediately after 
her termination and because AAC terminated the manager’s 
employment. 
 
or down from that anchor and (b) weighting sunk costs when considering future investments are 
also reduced by accountability.” (citations omitted)). 
 93. See Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 787–92; Wistrich et al., supra note 8, 
at 1286–91. 
 94. Guthrie et al., supra note 8, at 791–92. 
 95. Wistrich et al., supra note 8, at 1288–91. 
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The ALJs learn that the administrative code authorizes them to 
award compensatory damages for “mental anguish.” They also learn 
that controlling case law provides that such an award is justified when 
“there is credible testimony of some degree of emotional distress.” In 
this instance, we informed the ALJs that Veronica provided credible 
testimony that she has suffered from “anxiety, sleeplessness, and bad 
dreams.” We also informed the ALJs that Veronica mentioned, as an 
aside, that she recently saw a court TV show featuring a case she 
claimed was similar to hers. 
Unbeknownst to the ALJs, we assigned roughly half of them to a 
control group and half to an anchor group. The ALJs in the control 
group learn that the claimant in the court TV show Veronica watched 
received a compensatory damage award, but no dollar amount was 
specified. The ALJs assigned to the anchor group learn that Veronica 
mentioned that the claimant in the court TV show had received a 
compensatory damage award in the amount of $415,300. We then 
asked the ALJs in both groups to indicate the amount of 
compensatory damages they would award Veronica for her mental 
anguish. The anchor in this instance—an alleged award observed on a 
court TV show—was irrelevant to the ALJs’ determination under the 
law. 
Furthermore, we directly tested whether accountability might 
influence the ALJs’ judgments by attempting to replicate Tetlock’s 
finding that making people explain their decisions would reduce or 
eliminate the anchoring effect. We informed roughly half of the 
judges that further review of their award was “extremely unlikely.” 
Judges in these conditions were simply told to assign an award. We 
informed the other judges that review of their award and their 
explanation was very likely. These judges were asked both to assign 
an award and to provide an explanation for the award. 
The judges thus evaluated one of four different versions of the 
problem: (1) no anchor and no explanation required; (2) no anchor 
and an explanation required; (3) anchor and no explanation required; 
and (4) anchor and an explanation required.96 
 
 96. Although we were concerned that the request for an explanation might have induced 
some judges not to answer the question, this does not appear to have been the case. Twenty-one 
judges did not respond to this question: seven in the control, no-explanation condition; four in 
the control, explanation condition; four in the anchor, no-explanation condition; and six in the 
anchor and explanation condition. Among the forty-three judges who provided an award in the 
explanation conditions, four did not provide an explanation (one in the control condition and 
three in the anchor condition). These judges were nevertheless kept in the analysis. 
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The anchor affected the ALJs’ judgment. The judges in the 
control awarded an average amount of $35,488; the judges in the 
anchor group awarded a much larger $58,775 on average. The 
averages are a bit misleading because the distribution of damage 
awards in both conditions was highly positively skewed, but as Table 
2a shows, the anchor shifted the entire distribution of awards upward. 
A sizeable number of judges thought that no damage award was 
appropriate, even though we had indicated that the employer was 
only contesting the “request for damages.” In the control condition, 
28.6 percent (twelve out of forty-two) of the judges provided an 
award of $0, whereas only 7.5 percent (three out of forty) did so in the 
anchor condition. 













35,488 28.6       0  6,250  10,000 
Anchor (40) 58,775  7.5 5,000 50,000 100,000 
Accountability did not affect judgment by itself. The judges who 
were not asked to provide an explanation gave an average award of 
$66,308, whereas the judges who were asked to provide an 
explanation gave an average damage award of $29,198. On the face of 
it, it seems that the explanation requirement reduced awards 
substantially. But as Table 2b shows, the explanation did not have 
much effect on the overall range of awards, suggesting that the 
differences in the averages are the result of a few extremely high 
awards in the no-explanation condition. In fact, the no-explanation 
condition included a $400,000 award and a $1,000,000 award, whereas 
the highest award in the explanation condition was a $200,000 
award.97 Also, in the no-explanation condition, 12.8 percent (five out 
of thirty-nine) of the judges provided an award of $0; in the 
explanation condition, by contrast, 23.3 percent (ten out of forty-
three) did so. 
 
 97. The $1,000,000 award was in the no anchor condition. The five next highest awards 
were in the anchor condition. 
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Table 2b. Damage Awards by Explanation in the Anchoring Problem 
Condition  









No Explanation (39) 66,308 12.8 5,000 10,000 50,000 
Explanation (43) 29,198 23.3 2,000 10,000 50,000 
Even though the explanation had no effect on its own, we were 
primarily interested in whether requiring an explanation would 
ameliorate the effect of the anchor. Thus, we assessed the interaction 
between the anchor and the explanation. Table 2c reports these 
results. As the sample sizes get small, the results become somewhat 
erratic. But a comparison of the anchor and control conditions, both 
with and without explanations, suggests that the anchoring effect is 
robust; requiring an explanation did not diminish its power much, if at 
all. The magnitude of the anchoring effect, as measured by the 
difference between the averages in the anchor and control conditions 
is roughly $11,000 in the no-explanation condition. The anchoring 
effect is higher still—$31,000—when an explanation was required, but 
this was due largely to the presence of an award of $1,000,000 in the 
control, no-explanation condition. The differences between the 
medians and percentiles in the anchor and control conditions provide 
a more reliable measure of the anchoring effect. Comparing those 
differences shows that both with and without explanation, the anchor 
shifted the awards upward throughout the full range. 
Table 2c. Damage Awards by Explanation in the Anchoring Problem 








Control (19) 60,789 21.5    500   7,500   10,000 No 
Explanation Anchor (20) 71,550   5.0 6500 50,000 100,000 
Control (23) 14,586 34.8      0   5,000   10,000 Explanation 
Anchor (20) 46,000 10.0 5000 37,500   75,000 
Because the distribution of the awards was highly skewed, 
assessing the results with statistical tests first required transforming 
the data. We took the square root of the award to produce data that 
more closely approximated a normal distribution and subjected the 
transformed data to a 2x2 ANOVA. The results showed that the 
anchor had a significant effect,98 but neither the explanation, nor the 
 
 98. F(1, 78) = 8.44, p < .005. 
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interaction of explanation with the anchor, affected the awards 
significantly.99 
2. Framing and Fairness.  When people evaluate numeric 
options, they tend to code or “frame” them as either gains or losses.100 
Because the very same options can often be presented as either gains 
or losses, and because most people find losses much more 
unattractive than they find gains attractive, the framing of a problem 
can lead to impressionistic and irrational judgments.101 
Framing can influence a wide range of judgments. In one study 
of the framing phenomenon, for example, Professors Daniel 
Kahneman, Jack Knetsch, and Richard Thaler gave one group of 
subjects a “loss” version of a problem and gave another group of 
subjects a “gain” version of the same problem.102 In the “loss” version, 
the subjects learn that: 
A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community 
experiencing a recession with substantial unemployment but no 
inflation. There are many workers anxious to work at the company. 
The company decides to decrease wages and salaries 7 percent this 
year.103 
In the “gain” version, the subjects learn that: 
 
 99. F(1, 78) = 1.65, p = .20, F(1, 78) = .01, p > .90, respectively for the effect of the 
accountability manipulation and the interaction of this variable with the anchoring condition. 
Further analysis of the judges’ gender, years of experience, and whether they make 
recommendations showed that these variables did not affect the judges’ awards. For gender and 
recommendation, this was done using a 2x2x2 ANOVA on anchor condition, explanation 
condition, and gender; all F’s involving gender < 1.4, p’s > .20; all F’s involving recommendation 
< 1.5, p’s > .20. Experience was tested with ANCOVA, using experience as a continuous 
variable; all F’s involving experience and its interactions < 1.10, p’s > .25. The judge’s CRT score 
likewise had no effect. CRT score was tested with ANCOVA, using CRT score as a continuous 
variable; all F’s involving CRT score and its interactions < .15, p’s > .70. This last result was not 
entirely a surprise, as other researchers have found that scores on the CRT do not correlate with 
the anchoring effect. Oechssler et al., supra note 79, at 6 (“Furthermore, the effect of anchoring 
is not diminished by cognitive ability. In fact, if anything, the High CRT group seems to be more 
susceptible to anchoring, although this effect is not significant.”). 
 100. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342 (1984) (“[T]he psychophysical analysis of outcomes should be applied 
to gains and losses rather than to total assets.”). 
 101. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on 
Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 731 (1986) (“These 
characteristics of evaluation make preferences vulnerable to framing effects, in which 
inconsequential variations in the presentation of a choice problem affect the decision.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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[A company is making a small profit. It is located in a community 
experiencing a recession with] substantial unemployment and 
inflation of 12%. [There are many workers anxious to work at the 
company.] The company decides to increase salaries only 5% this 
year.104 
The researchers asked both groups of subjects to evaluate the 
fairness of the company’s conduct. In both versions of the problem, 
the employees end up in exactly the same position; that is, the effect 
of the company’s wage decision is to leave employees 7 percent worse 
off than before. Despite the economic equivalence of the two options, 
however, the subjects responded quite differently to the two 
situations: 62 percent of subjects thought the 7 percent wage 
reduction in a no-inflation environment was unfair, but only 22 
percent of the subjects in the 5 percent wage increase in a 12 percent 
inflation environment felt the same way.105 Although multiple 
interpretations of these results are possible, the most persuasive is 
that the subjects reacted to the framing of the problem. The subjects 
interpreted the 7 percent wage reduction as a loss, but interpreted the 
5 percent pay raise in a 12 percent inflation environment as a gain. As 
the researchers explained, “A wage cut is coded as a loss and 
consequently judged unfair. A nominal raise which does not 
compensate for inflation is more acceptable because it is coded as a 
gain to the employee, relative to the reference wage.”106 
In our previous work, we have found some evidence that framing 
can influence generalist judges when they evaluate settlement 
offers.107 To explore whether framing might influence ALJs on the 
job, we gave the ALJs who attended the city conference a problem 
similar to the wage problem described above. Building on the real-
world observation that companies (for example, gas stations) 
frequently offer cash discounts (which are viewed as a prospective 
gain to the consumer) but seldom impose credit card surcharges 
(which are viewed as a prospective loss to the consumer), we gave the 
ALJs a problem called the “Nonpayment Case.” Some of the ALJs 
received a “loss” version of our problem: 
 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 731–32. 
 107. See Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 794–97 (describing how 
“categorization, or ‘framing,’ of decision options influences the way people evaluate options and 
affects their willingness to incur risk” in the context of litigation). 
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Imagine that you are presiding in a nonpayment case filed by a 
landlord against a tenant whom he claims is delinquent on his rent. 
During the proceeding, you learn that the monthly rent is $2,000, but 
the landlord imposes a $50 per month surcharge if the tenant 
chooses to pay by credit card. 
We gave the other ALJs a “gain” version of the same problem: 
Imagine that you are presiding in a nonpayment case filed by a 
landlord against a tenant whom he claims is delinquent on his rent. 
During the proceeding, you learn that the monthly rent is $2,100, but 
the landlord offers a $50 per month discount if the tenant chooses to 
pay by check or cash. 
We asked the ALJs in both groups to evaluate the fairness of the 
landlord’s conduct as “completely fair,” “acceptable,” “unfair,” or 
“very unfair.” In both instances, the tenant will pay the same 
amount—$2,050—if she chooses the special payment option made 
available by the landlord. 
Despite the economic equivalence of outcomes, however, the 
ALJs reacted quite differently to the two versions of this problem, as 
Table 3 shows. Of the seventeen ALJs who evaluated the fairness of 
the credit card surcharge, 47.1 percent found the landlord’s behavior 
unfair. Of the twenty-one ALJs who evaluated the fairness of the cash 
discount, however, a mere 4.8 percent found the landlord’s behavior 
unfair. The framing of the problem had a significant impact on the 
way the ALJs evaluated it.108 
 
 108. Ordered logit regression showed that the effect of framing was significant. z = 2.87, p < 
.005. Further analysis of the judges’ gender and years of experience, also using ordered logit 
regressions, showed that neither the main effect of variables nor their interaction with frame 
affected the judges’ ratings. For gender, z’s < 1.62, p’s > .10; for experience, z’s < .65, p’s > .50. 
The judges’ CRT scores likewise did not affect the results. z’s < 1.10, p’s > .25. Although 
framing effects have been found to correlate with CRT scores in other contexts, the type of 
framing effect we studied here has not. Oechssler et al., supra note 79, at 4 (“For both items 
[coded as gains and losses], the High CRT group is more likely to choose the alternative that is 
compatible with risk neutrality.”). That is, the framing of an option as a gain or a loss influences 
people’s willingness to undertake risk and the framing influences how much importance people 
attach to gains and losses; the former, but not the latter, appears to be related to the cognitive 
abilities that the CRT is measuring. 
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Table 3. Evaluations of Fairness of Rent Payment  
Percent who gave each evaluation (and n) Condition  
(and sample size) Completely 
Fair 
Acceptable Unfair Very 
Unfair 
Gains/Discount (21) 29% (6) 67% (14) 5% (1) 0%  
Losses/Surcharge (17) 6%  (1) 47% (8) 41% (7) 6% (1) 
3. Conjunction.  The so-called “extension rule” 109 is “perhaps the 
simplest and most transparent rule of probability theory.” 110 This rule 
states that “if A is a subset of B, then the probability of A cannot 
exceed that of B.”111 For example, the probability of a terrorist act in 
New York City (A) cannot exceed the probability of a terrorist act in 
the United States (B) because the United States includes New York 
City (as well as many other locations that might be subjected to such 
an attack). Implicit in the extension rule is the “conjunction rule.”112 
This rule states that “the probability of A&B can exceed the 
probability of neither A nor B, since it is contained in both.”113 For 
example, the probability of a terrorist attack in New York City 
carried out by Muslim extremists (A&B) cannot exceed the 
probability of a terrorist attack in New York City (A) or the 
probability of a terrorist act carried out by Muslim extremists (B). 
The extension and conjunction rules are deductively accurate, as 
only a little deliberation shows. Psychologists have found repeatedly, 
however, that people tend to violate these rules of logic. Rather than 
engaging in careful deliberation, which leads to compliance with the 
rule, people often engage in intuitive, impressionistic thinking and 
thereby violate the rules. To many, it seems more likely that New 
York City might face a terrorist act committed by Muslim extremists 
than that New York City might face a terrorist attack. 
 
 109. Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, How Alike Is It Versus How Likely Is It: A Disjunction 
Fallacy in Probability Judgments, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1119, 1119 (1993); see 
also Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The 
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 PSYCHOL. REV. 293, 293–94 (1983) 
(“[P]robability theory does not determine the probabilities of uncertain events—it merely 
imposes constraints on the relations among them. For example, if A is more probable than B, 
then the complement of A must be less probable than the complement of B.”). 
 110. Researchers have described this as “perhaps the simplest and most transparent rule of 
probability theory,” Bar-Hillel & Neter, supra note 109, at 1130, which “even untrained and 
unsophisticated people accept and endorse,” id. 
 111. Id. at 1119. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
RACHLINSKI IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:08:30 PM 
1510 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 58:1477 
The most famous problem of this type—the “Linda 
Problem”114—is instructive. In this widely administered problem, 
Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman gave subjects the 
following information about Linda: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She 
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with 
issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in 
anti-nuclear demonstrations.115 
The researchers asked the subjects to rank-order the likelihood 
of eight different statements, including these three: “Linda is active in 
the feminist movement”; “Linda is a bank teller”; and “Linda is a 
bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”116 The description 
made it seem as though Linda was a feminist, but not a bank teller. 
As a result, subjects generally reported that it was more likely that 
Linda was a bank teller active in the feminist movement than that she 
was a bank teller.117 This is wrong. Under the conjunction rule, it 
cannot possibly be the case that it is more likely that Linda is a bank 
teller and is active in the feminist movement than that she is simply a 
bank teller.118 
To explore whether ALJs would comply with, or violate, the 
conjunction rule, we gave those who attended the national conference 
a problem called the “Employment Case.” We asked the ALJs to 
imagine that they were presiding in a case involving an employment 
dispute between Dina El Saba, a public sector employee, and the 
agency for which she previously worked. The judges learn that Dina 
worked as an administrative assistant for a senior manager named 
Peter before the agency fired her. While at the agency, Dina’s 
 
 114. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, 
Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES 84, 92 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
 115. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 114, at 
92. 
 116. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 114, at 
92. 
 117. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 109, at 297; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 114, at 
93. 
 118. The Linda problem can be criticized as methodologically flawed in that people might 
be assuming that the single feature is actually meant to be the conjunction of “bank teller” and 
“not active in the feminist movement.” But Tversky and Kahneman have administered a version 
in which they avoid this problem by changing the second response to “Linda is a bank teller 
whether or not she is active in the feminist movement” and obtained similar results. Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 109, at 299. 
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employment evaluations were “average” to “above average,” so she 
claimed her termination must have been motivated by unlawful 
discrimination. The agency contends, instead, that it terminated Dina 
because she repeatedly violated workplace rules and norms. Among 
other things, she “took too many breaks during the workday and took 
odd days off as holidays”; “dressed in ways that made her co-workers 
and agency visitors feel uncomfortable, covering herself mostly in 
black”; acted “odd” and “aloof”; and refused to eat lunch in the 
presence of male coworkers. 
Based solely on these facts, we asked the ALJs to rank-order the 
likelihood of the following four options: 
_____ The agency unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on 
her Islamic religious beliefs. 
_____ The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce. 
_____ The agency adhered to its internal employment policies. 
_____ The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce but also 
unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic 
religious beliefs. 
Option four (“The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce 
but also unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic 
beliefs”) is a conjunction of option one (“The agency unlawfully 
discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic religious beliefs”) 
and option two (“The agency actively recruited a diverse 
workforce”). Hence, option four is, as a matter of deductive logic, less 
likely than either option one or option two. Nevertheless, we believed 
that many judges would violate the conjunction rule by identifying 
option four as more likely than either option one or option two (or 
both). 
As expected, we found that the ALJs violated the conjunction 
rule. Rather than thinking through the problem deliberatively, which 
would have led them to rank-order options one and two as more 
likely than option four, we found the exact opposite. Of the ninety-
nine ALJs who responded to this problem, eighty-four (or 84.8 
percent) violated the conjunction rule in some way. These eighty-four 
judges committed all of the possible errors, albeit at different rates: 
thirty-three rated the fourth option as either equally likely as, or more 
likely than, both the first and second options;119thirty-six ranked the 
 
 119. Of these thirty-three judges, twenty ranked the fourth option as more likely than both 
options one and two, eight wrote in that they were all equally likely, three assigned the same 
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fourth option as either equally likely as, or more likely than, the first 
option (but not the second option);120 fifteen ranked the fourth option 
as either equally likely as, or more likely than, the second option (but 
not the first option).121 Thus, the problem lured most judges into 
committing the conjunction error, just as in the classic Linda 
problem.122 
4. Hindsight/Outcome Bias.  Psychologists have found that 
people are vulnerable to the “hindsight bias,” which is the tendency 
for prior outcomes to seem more predictable than was actually the 
case.123 Once the outcome of an event is known, that outcome comes 
to feel inevitable or at least much more likely to have occurred than it 
would have seemed before it actually happened. 
 
ranking to options one and two as option four, and two simply put a check mark next to option 
four. 
 120. Of these thirty-six judges, one ranked the first and fourth options as equally likely. 
 121. Of these fifteen judges, seven ranked the first and fourth options as equally likely. 
 122. Although female judges were somewhat more likely to commit the conjunction error 
than male judges (89 percent, or fifty out of fifty-six, versus 79 percent, or thirty-one out of 
thirty-nine, respectively), this difference was not significant. Fisher’s exact, p = .24. More 
experienced judges tended to be more likely to commit the error than their younger 
counterparts, but this trend was also not significant. Logistic regression of committing the error 
on years of experience yielded a negative, but not significant, coefficient of -.048, z = 1.35, p = 
.18. The error rate was also nearly identical among judges who make recommendations as 
opposed to the other judges (86 percent, or thirty-six out of forty-two, versus 84 percent, or 
forty-two out of fifty, respectively). This was not a significant difference. Fisher’s exact, p = 1.00. 
Previous work on the CRT has shown that people who score high on the CRT are less 
likely to commit the conjunction error. Oechssler et al., supra note 79, at 5 (“Of our subjects in 
the Low CRT group, 62.6% [committed the conjunction fallacy on the ‘Linda’ problem, but 
t]his percentage is much lower for the High CRT group at 38.3% . . . .”). We found that among 
the judges who scored perfectly on the CRT and answered this question, 72 percent (thirteen 
out of eighteen) committed the fallacy, whereas 86 percent (sixty out of seventy) of the judges 
who got at least one of the CRT questions wrong committed the fallacy. This difference was not, 
however, significant. Fisher’s exact, p = .29. The percentage who committed the conjunction 
error broken down by exact CRT score is: zero right on CRT, 84 percent (twenty-five out of 
thirty); one right on CRT, 86 percent (nineteen out of twenty-two); two right on CRT, 89 
percent (sixteen out of eighteen); three right on CRT, 72 percent (thirteen out of eighteen). We 
also ran a logistic regression of whether the judges committed the error based with CRT score 
as a predictor, which also showed no significant effect. z = .72, p = .47. That we only observed a 
trend might be due to a somewhat small sample size with which to identify the effect. 
 123. See Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on 
Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & 
PERFORMANCE 288, 288 (1975) (“Reporting an outcome’s occurrence increases its perceived 
probability of occurrence . . . .”). 
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Outcome information can lead not only to the hindsight bias but 
also to the “outcome bias.”124 In contrast to the hindsight bias, which 
posits that outcome information can affect probability judgments, the 
outcome bias posits that people use outcome information to evaluate 
the quality of the decision made. In short, “people take outcomes into 
account in a way that is irrelevant to the true quality of the 
decision.”125 
In previous work, we have found that judges are sometimes 
prone to the hindsight bias126 and sometimes not.127 To explore 
whether outcome information would influence ALJs, we gave the 
ALJs attending the city conference a problem called the “Human 
Rights Complaint.”128 We asked the ALJs to imagine that they were 
presiding over a pretrial hearing in which Malcolm Jones, a fourteen-
year-old African-American boy, has filed a complaint against a large 
toy store located in Midtown Manhattan alleging that he was harassed 
and detained because of his race. 
The ALJs learn that Jones was in the store one day with four 
friends and that they were being loud, pushing and shoving, and 
“playing around” inside the store. Jones claims that he wandered into 
the video game section, played a little, and then was wrestled to the 
floor roughly by a guard. The guard dragged him into a back room, 
accused him of shoplifting, and according to Jones, subjected him to 
several racial slurs. 
At the hearing, the guard testified that he began watching the 
group when they messed up the stuffed animals section of the store. 
He reported that he kept a close eye on Jones, in particular. He 
followed Jones and the other boys into the video game section and 
claims that he thought he saw Jones lift a video game cartridge from a 
countertop, prompting him to arrest Jones for shoplifting. 
 
 124. Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988) (“At issue here is whether there is an outcome 
bias . . . .”). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 799–803. 
 127. See Wistrich et al., supra note 8, at 1313–16 (finding no statistically significant 
difference in judges’ conclusions based on foresight as compared to their conclusions based on 
hindsight). 
 128. Our study is similar to, and was inspired in part by, a study conducted by Professor 
Jonathan Casper and his colleagues. See Jonathan D. Casper, Kennette Benedict & Jo L. Perry, 
Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291 (1989). 
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The guard admitted that among the five boys who came in 
together, Jones was the only African-American (the others were 
white), but denies that this made any difference to him. The guard 
stated that “the kid just looked like trouble; it wasn’t because he was 
black.” 
We informed the ALJs that they were to issue a report on this 
case, and we asked them to indicate whether they believed the store 
did or did not discriminate against Jones because of his race. 
Unbeknownst to the ALJs, we randomly assigned them to one of two 
groups, each of which received different outcome information about 
the alleged shoplifting. The ALJs in one group learned that “[t]he 
game cartridge was, in fact, found inside Jones’s coat. Jones claims he 
intended to pay for it, even though he did not have enough money 
with him to buy it.” The ALJs in the other group learned that “[t]he 
game cartridge was not, in fact, found on Jones. The guard claims ‘he 
must have ditched it somehow when he saw me coming.’” The 
outcome information we provided is arguably irrelevant to assessing 
whether the store discriminated against Jones. In both instances, 
there is conflicting evidence about the guard’s behavior, about Jones’s 
behavior, and about their respective credibility as witnesses. 
To be sure, the fact that Jones was found with a stolen game 
cartridge in one version might undermine his credibility, and the 
judges might sensibly fill in any perceived gaps in the story based on 
their knowledge that Jones had the cartridge. But this is precisely how 
the hindsight and outcome biases work—people fill in the details of 
the story with their knowledge of the outcome.129 This process might 
be a reasonable one if the target actor (in this case the guard) had 
known the details beforehand—in which case it is the outcome bias at 
work. But people also tend to fill in more details than were actually 
available to the target actor—in which case it is the hindsight bias at 
work. Admittedly, this problem does not perfectly distinguish 
between the hindsight bias and outcome bias, as a short problem will 
invariably leave some detail to be filled in (a videotape of the events 
from the guard’s point of view would have been necessary to 
demonstrate any difference to be the product of the hindsight bias 
also). But we did identify the most salient facts of this situation for 
the judges. And given the data on how robust and widespread the 
 
 129. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 584 (1998) (“[P]eople naturally integrate an outcome and the events that 
preceded it into a coherent story.”). 
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hindsight bias is,130 and how it can affect situations exactly like this 
one,131 we suggest that differences between the judgment in these two 
conditions would be attributable in at least some degree to 
improperly imputing insights to the guard that he could not 
reasonably be expected to have had. 
We found that the ALJs responded quite differently to the two 
versions of this problem. Among the twenty-two judges who learned 
that Jones was not shoplifting, 64 percent (fourteen) of the judges 
determined that the guard had discriminated against Jones because of 
his race, whereas only 29 percent (five) of the seventeen judges who 
learned Jones was guilty made the same determination. This 
difference is significant.132 
 
 130. Id. at 581 (“[A]cross a wide variety of tasks, materials, and populations, a sizeable and 
consistent bias clouds judgments made in hindsight.” (footnote omitted)). 
 131. See Casper et al., supra note 128, at 300 (reporting that subjects assessing a potential 
civil rights violation displayed a “hindsight-bias-like process” in relying on outcome 
information). 
 132. Fisher’s exact test, p = .05. 
Further analysis of gender, years of experience, and CRT score revealed some interesting 
trends. Male judges expressed a stronger hindsight bias than their female counterparts. Among 
the male judges, 71 percent (ten out of fourteen) of those who read about the innocent kid 
concluded that the guard had discriminated, as compared to 13 percent (one out of eight) of 
those who read about the guilty kid. By contrast, among the female judges, 50 percent (four out 
of eight) who read about the innocent kid concluded that the guard had discriminated, as 
compared to 44 percent (four out of nine) of the judges who read about the guilty kid. The 
different reaction to the knowledge of the outcome between male and female judges was 
marginally significant. Ordered logit of finding of discrimination on the condition, gender, and 
interaction of condition and gender produced a marginal effect for the interaction. z = 1.69, p = 
.09. 
The more experience the judges had, the less that they were influenced by the outcome, 
although this trend only approached significance. Ordered logit of finding of discrimination on 
the condition, experience, and interaction of condition and experience produced a coefficient of 
-.15, which was not significant. z = 1.55, p = .11. An effect of experience here is consistent with 
previous research on the hindsight bias, which demonstrates smaller effects among people with 
greater knowledge. See Jay J.J. Chistensen-Szalansky & Cynthia Fobian Williams, The 
Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
147, 162 (1991) (“[Hindsight] effects are further reduced when the subject is familiar with the 
task, i.e., has expertise in or experience with the task.”). 
The CRT score did not appear to influence the judges’ judgment on this task. Ordered 
logit of finding of discrimination on the condition, CRT score, and interaction of condition and 
CRT produced no significant interaction. z = .50, p = .62. Because there is no finding that CRT 
score influences the hindsight bias, this was not surprising. 
Because eleven of the judges identified themselves as primarily responsible for employee 
discipline (nine judges) or discrimination (two judges) cases, we tried to assess whether these 
judges behaved differently than the other judges who did not have such experience. Among the 
judges with no experience in this area, 71 percent (ten out of fourteen) of those who read about 
the innocent kid concluded that the guard had discriminated, as compared to 31 percent (four 
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5. Disregarding.  People have great difficulty deliberately 
disregarding salient information.133 In one classic illustration, 
researchers asked subjects participating in an elaborate experiment 
“not to think of a white bear.”134 The subjects had great difficulty 
carrying out this seemingly simple task. In fact, they reported thinking 
about a white bear more when instructed not to do so than when they 
were not given such an instruction.135 
In previous work, we have found that generalist judges have 
difficulty deliberately disregarding relevant but inadmissible evidence 
when making decisions, but that they can overcome their intuitive 
responses in some instances.136 To explore whether ALJs might be 
similarly influenced, we gave the ALJs attending the national 
conference a problem called “The Alleged Rats.”137 
We asked the ALJs to imagine that they were presiding over a 
case brought by the Department of Health against a Café for alleged 
health code violations involving a reported rat infestation. The ALJs 
learned that the city’s Health Department sent an inspector to the 
restaurant after neighbors complained of a rat infestation in the Café 
and the alleyway behind it. The inspector visited the site and found 
two large rat traps in the basement of the Café and an empty box of 
rat poison. He also took statements from a neighbor who indicated 
that he had complained about the rats, but that the Café’s owner had 
refused to do anything about it. The neighbor asserted that he had 
 
out of thirteen) of those who read about the guilty kid. By contrast, among the judges with 
experience, 57 percent (four out of seven) who read about the innocent kid concluded that the 
guard had discriminated, as compared to 50 percent (one out of two) of the judges who read 
about the guilty kid. This suggests that experience might induce deliberative decisionmaking, 
but because only two experienced judges read about the guilty kid, the results cannot be 
interpreted as anything more than suggesting that experience aids judges’ ability to avoid the 
hindsight and outcome bias. 
 133. See Jonathan M. Golding & Debra L. Long, There’s More to Intentional Forgetting than 
Directed Forgetting: An Integrative Review, in INTENTIONAL FORGETTING: INTERDISCIPLINARY 
APPROACHES 59, 93 (Jonathan M. Golding & Colin M. MacLeod eds., 1998) (reviewing 
theoretical accounts of this phenomenon); Hollyn M. Johnson, Processes of Successful 
Intentional Forgetting, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 274, 274 (1994) (“[The] success of intentional 
forgetting depends on how one originally encoded the to-be-forgotten information . . . .”). 
 134. Daniel M. Wegner et al., Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression, 53 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 6–7 (1987). 
 135. Id. at 7. 
 136. See Wistrich et al., supra note 8, at 1323–23 (concluding that although judges “do not 
disregard inadmissible information” in all cases, they are able to do so in some circumstances). 
 137. We pilot tested a version of this problem with ALJs at the city conference and made 
some adjustments to the context of the problem in light of recommendations from some of the 
judges in attendance. 
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seen the rats almost daily. Based on this evidence, the inspector cited 
the Café for a violation of the City’s Health Code. 
We informed the ALJs that the inspector and complaining 
neighbor testified to the facts above and that the neighbor also 
reported that he had a friend who had seen rats there. The Café 
owner, by contrast, denied that there was a rat problem. 
The ALJs learn that per the Health Code the Health 
Department has the burden of proving that a violation of the Health 
Code occurred. They also learn that if they find that the restaurant 
violated the Health Code, they can impose a fine of up to $2,000. 
We divided the ALJs into three groups: a control group and two 
experimental groups. The ALJs in the control group received no 
additional information. The ALJs in the two experimental groups 
learned that the neighbor produced “a photo of rats on the floor of 
the kitchen, which he contends was taken by his friend” while his 
friend was visiting. The Café owner denies that the photograph 
depicts his kitchen, and the Café owner’s lawyer moves to exclude it 
as improperly authenticated. We provided this additional information 
to the ALJs in both experimental groups, but for one of the groups 
we also included a copy of the photograph, showing two rats running 
along a floor. 
We then asked the ALJs in both experimental groups how they 
would rule on the Café owner’s motion to exclude the evidence. 
Finally, we compared the fines levied by the control group ALJs to 
the fines levied by the ALJs in the experimental groups who granted 
the defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence. Even though these 
judges indicated by their rulings that they deemed the evidence 
irrelevant to their decisionmaking, we hypothesized that this 
information would nonetheless influence the fines they set in the case, 
particularly for those ALJs exposed to the highly salient photograph 
of the rats. In short, we expected that the control group ALJs would 
levy the lowest fines, the experimental group ALJs not exposed to the 
photograph would levy slightly higher fines, and the experimental 
group ALJs exposed to the photograph would levy the highest fines. 
We found that the inadmissible evidence in this case had only 
limited influence on the ALJs. That is, the results reveal some trends, 
but no significant effects. A greater percentage of the judges who saw 
the photograph (85 percent, or twenty-three out of twenty-seven) 
than who read about it (71 percent, or twenty-two out of thirty-one) 
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excluded it, but this difference was not significant.138 The judges who 
saw the photograph of the rats seemed to award higher fines. The 
average fine among the thirty-nine judges who did not see the 
photograph was $646, as opposed to $566 among the judges who read 
about (and excluded) the photograph, and $967 among the judges 
who saw the photograph (and excluded it).139 The awards were highly 
erratic, however, with many judges choosing to impose no fine ($0), 
and others imposing the maximum $2,000 fine, as Table 4 below 
reports. Accordingly, the apparent differences between the three 
versions were not significant.140 

















No rats (39) — 646 51 26 23 
Read about 
Rats (31) 
71 566 50 32 18 
Saw Photo of 
Rats (27) 
85 967 35 35 30 
* Excluding those who admitted the testimony141 
6. Egocentric Bias.  Psychologists have found that people tend to 
make judgments about themselves, their abilities, and their beliefs 
that are egocentric or self-serving.142 People routinely estimate, for 
example, that they are well above average on characteristics that are 
 
 138. Fisher’s exact test, p = .22. 
 139. Six judges did not provide complete responses: one judge in the condition without the 
evidence gave no award; one judge who read about the photo ruled it inadmissible, but gave no 
award; one judge (in the third condition) refused to rule or award; one judge who saw the photo 
ruled it admissible but gave no award; two judges who saw the photo ruled it inadmissible but 
gave no award. 
 140. A tobit regression of the award on two dummy-coded variables to reflect the three 
conditions did not produce a significant effects for the regression (p < .33) or for either of the 
dummy codes (for exposure to the evidence versus the control condition, t =.22, p =.83, for 
exposure to the photo versus the other two conditions, t = 1.32, p = .19). 
 141. Among the nine judges who read about the photo of the rats and admitted the 
testimony, three chose the maximum fine, three chose fines between $0 and $2,000 (specifically, 
$400, $500, and $1500), and three chose no fine ($0); the average fine was $933. Among the four 
judges who saw the photo of the rats and admitted the testimony, two chose the maximum fine 
and two chose no fine ($0), yielding an average of $1,000. 
 142. See Michael Ross & Fiore Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 322, 333 (1979) (“[T]he egocentric biases in availability and 
attribution appear to be robust and pervasive.”). 
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important to them, such as their health,143 the likely duration of their 
marriage,144 their driving ability,145 and so forth.146 
In previous work, we have found that generalist judges evaluate 
themselves in self-serving or egocentric ways.147 To explore whether 
ALJs might be prone to self-serving bias, we asked the ALJs 
attending the city conference to compare themselves to the other 
attendees on three dimensions: their ability to assess the credibility of 
a witness, their ability to avoid bias, and their ability to facilitate 
settlements. With regard to each, we asked the judges to place 
themselves into one of four quartiles: the top 25 percent, the next 25 
percent, the next 25 percent, or the bottom 25 percent. 
The ALJs provided self-serving interpretations of their skills, as 
Table 5 shows. With regard to assessing the credibility of witnesses, 
83.3 percent of the ALJs placed themselves in the top half; 
specifically, 25 percent placed themselves in the top quartile and 58.3 
percent placed themselves in the second quartile. Not a single ALJ 
placed herself in the bottom quartile. The ALJs were nearly as 
sanguine about their ability to facilitate settlements, as 86.2 percent 
placed themselves in the top half (30.6 percent placed themselves in 
the top quartile and 55.6 percent placed themselves in the second 
quartile). When it came to their capacity for avoiding bias in judging, 
a whopping 97.2 percent of the ALJs placed themselves in the top 
half—that is, 50 percent placed themselves in the top quartile and 
47.2 percent placed themselves in the second quartile. Again, not a 
single ALJ placed herself in the bottom quartile. Although only 50 
percent of the ALJs can be in the top half of their peers in these three 
 
 143. Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 809–11 (1980). 
 144. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: 
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 
441–43 (1993). 
 145. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 
ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 145–46 (1981). 
 146. But see Don A. Moore & Deborah A. Small, Error and Bias in Comparative Judgment: 
On Being Both Better and Worse than We Think We Are, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
972, 973–74 (2007) (arguing that self-serving responses are often reasonable ones given the 
subjects’ ignorance about how others perform on such tasks). 
 147. Guthrie et al., Judicial Mind, supra note 8, at 813–14. 
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components of their judicial behavior, most of the ALJs rated 
themselves this way.148 
Table 5: Self-Serving Assessments of Judicial Skills 
Percent in each Quartile Skill 




than top 25% 
Better than 
25%, worse 
than top 50% 
Worse 
than 75% 
Evaluating Credibility (36) 25 58 17 0 
Facilitating Settlement (36) 31 56 8 6 
Avoiding Prejudice (36) 50 47 3 0 
D. Summary 
Even though they specialize in particular areas of law, face 
greater accountability, and get more feedback than their generalist 
 
 148. The distribution of these results departs significantly from what one would expect if 
there were no bias: Evaluating credibility, χ2(3) = 26.0, p < .001; facilitating settlement, 
χ2(3) = 24.2, p < .001; avoiding prejudice, χ2(3) = 32.2, p < .001. 
Further analysis revealed that female judges made assessments that were somewhat more 
self-serving than male judges as to some of their abilities. Female judges made somewhat more 
self-serving assessments of their abilities to assess witness credibility than male judges (76 
percent, or sixteen out of twenty-one male judges, versus 93 percent, or fourteen out of fifteen 
female judges), but an ordered logit regression of the rating against gender revealed that this 
tendency was not significant. z = 1.42, p = .16. Female judges, however, rated their abilities to 
facilitate settlement high; whereas 76 percent (sixteen out of twenty-one) of the male judges 
rated themselves as better than the median judge, all fifteen female judges did so. An ordered 
logit regression of the rating against gender revealed that this difference was a marginally 
significant effect. z = 1.71, p = .09. Male and female judges made roughly equally self-serving 
assessments of their ability to avoid bias (the only judge to rate himself below the median was a 
male judge). An ordered logit regression of the rating against gender revealed no significant 
effect. z = .46, p = .64. 
CRT score also affected the self-serving bias. Judges who scored high on the CRT made 
somewhat more modest assessments of their abilities to evaluate witness credibility. An ordered 
logit regression of the rating against CRT score revealed that this tendency was a marginally 
significant effect. z =1.69, p = .09. CRT score did not correlate with the judges' assessments of 
their abilities to facilitate settlement. An ordered logit regression of the rating against gender 
revealed that this difference was a marginally significant effect. z = .46, p = .64. But judges who 
scored high on the CRT made more modest assessments of their abilities to avoid prejudice. An 
ordered logit regression of the rating against CRT score revealed that this tendency was a 
significant effect. z = 2.01, p < .05. These results are consistent with previous work showing that 
those who do well on the CRT also tend to avoid self-serving assessments. Oechssler et al., 
supra note 79, at 6 (“The fraction of subjects who judge their performance in the CRT correctly 
is dramatically higher for the High CRT group at 67.8% than for the Low group (9.7%).”). 
Years of experience did not correlate with the judges’ self-serving tendencies on any of 
the three assessments. An ordered logit regression of the experience against each of the three 
evaluations revealed no significant effects: Evaluate witnesses, z = .45, p = .65; avoid prejudice, 
z = .48, p = .63; facilitate settlement, z = .23, p = .82. 
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colleagues, ALJs do not seem that different from the hundreds of 
generalist trial judges that we have studied. They performed similarly 
on both the CRT and on the judicial decisionmaking tasks. 
These results suggest that our intuitive-override model of judging 
is applicable not only to generalist trial judges but also to ALJs. Both 
kinds of judges gravitate toward intuitive judgment on generic 
judgment problems and prove generally susceptible to the heuristics 
and biases that tend to induce intuitive and impressionistic judgments 
in judicial-decisionmaking problems. The data suggest that ALJs—
despite their subject-matter expertise, high degree of accountability, 
and receipt of regular feedback—are predominantly intuitive 
decisionmakers, not unlike their counterparts in generalist 
courtrooms around the country. We found no evidence that judges 
who make recommendations (and hence are subject to greater 
feedback and accountability) react any differently to the problems we 
presented than their counterparts who are subject only to appeals. 
We also found no direct evidence that judges who are experienced in 
the areas that we studied were any more likely to rely on deliberation 
than those judges who were facing unfamiliar problems.149 That said, it 
is worth noting that the ALJs were quite resistant to the influence of 
the photograph of rats in a context that was similar to the kinds of 
cases over which many of them preside, which is encouraging. We 
also found some limited evidence suggesting that expertise might 
facilitate better judgment. Specifically, we found that the judges with 
greater experience were slightly less vulnerable to the hindsight 
bias.150 
It is also worth noting that we found that high-CRT judges were 
better at avoiding some of the errors in judgment than low-CRT 
 
 149. To be sure, our exploration of the impact of specialization on ALJ decisionmaking was 
imperfect. We tested two different samples of judges who spend most of their time in a wide 
variety of highly specialized areas. Because we could not easily anticipate what these specialties 
would be in advance of collecting the data and did not anticipate the degree of variation, our 
scenarios only infrequently and sporadically present fact patterns that match the specialty of the 
judges. Our scenarios for the New York judges (our first sample) included housing and 
discrimination issues, but we only had two judges who oversee housing cases and nine judges 
who address discrimination. In preparing for the study of national judges, we hoped to capitalize 
on the number of judges who addressed discrimination by using two scenarios involving 
discrimination, but the national sample included only four such judges. We also anticipated that 
a number of judges would identify themselves as addressing health, safety, sanitation, or 
environmental issues. This was true for both samples, but in the case of the New York judges, 
our materials were unusable, and in the national sample, we did not observe any effect that 
might vary by experience. 
 150. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
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judges; specifically, high-CRT judges were less egocentric151 and were 
slightly (but not statistically significantly) less likely to commit the 
conjunction fallacy.152 But our data do not suggest that simply hiring 
high-CRT judges would be a panacea for good judgment. In most 
contexts, judges who scored well on the CRT were just as likely to 
rely on misleading heuristics as those who did not. 
CONCLUSION 
The role that ALJs play in the judicial process has been a matter 
of great debate since the inception of the ALJ position. During the 
second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-
first century, ALJs and their agency superiors have engaged in an 
ongoing tug-of-war over the issue of ALJ authority and 
independence. Initially, the vast majority of ALJs were embedded in 
one agency or another. But they have steadily become more 
independent. Today, roughly 60 percent of American states house 
ALJs in a central panel, in which they act much more like generalist 
trial judges and are separated from the agencies whose disputes they 
adjudicate.153 Nevertheless, agencies generally enjoy expansive review 
over ALJ decisions, with no obligation to defer even to ALJ fact 
finding.154 
In this Article, we make two contributions to this debate. First, 
we find no meaningful differences in the quality of ALJ 
decisionmaking, regardless of the degree of independence that ALJs 
appear to enjoy in their present positions. That is, ALJs appear to 
make decisions in much the same way, whether they work solely for 
one agency, work in a central panel jurisdiction, or enjoy some other 
employment arrangement. This suggests that judicial independence, 
though valuable for other reasons,155 may not have much, if any, 
bearing on the quality of the justice ALJs actually dispense. 
Second, our work suggests that ALJs, like generalist judges, are 
likely to make mostly intuitive decisions. The intuitive approach is 
 
 151. See supra note 148. 
 152. See supra note 122. 
 153. See supra note 29. 
 154. See supra note 39. 
 155. See, e.g., Christopher B. McNeil, Perceptions of Fairness in State Administrative 
Hearings, 92 JUDICATURE 160, 162 (2009) (reporting that citizens find some central panel 
adjudications more fair than within-agency adjudications). 
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quick, effortless, spontaneous, and often accurate.156 As Professors 
Tversky and Kahneman observed in their early exploration of 
decisionmaking, intuitive thinking is “quite useful” and can often lead 
to accurate decisionmaking.157 That said, intuition can also lead 
decisionmakers astray. Again, as Tversky and Kahneman observed, 
intuitive thinking can “lead to severe and systematic errors.”158 In this 
Article, we found that ALJs relying on intuitive processing allowed 
an irrelevant anchor to influence compensatory damage awards; the 
framing of payment options to influence evaluations of the 
appropriateness of a landlord’s conduct; and the representativeness of 
a piece of information to influence evaluations of the likelihood of a 
defendant employer’s conduct. In these instances, the judges made 
erroneous judgments that they might have avoided by adopting a 
deliberative decisionmaking approach. 
Combining these two observations—that ALJs make 
predominantly intuitive decisions regardless of their formal 
independence from the agencies whose disputes they adjudicate—we 
conclude that judicial intuition, not judicial independence, is the more 
vexing challenge facing executive branch judges. There are sound 
reasons to worry about independence, but the executive branch—like 
the judiciary—should also worry about minimizing, channeling, and 
improving judicial intuition. Perhaps more than any other reform, this 
will enhance justice for litigants. 
 
 156. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 157. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 10, at 1124. 
 158. Id. 
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APPENDIX A:  MATERIALS USED AT THE  
NEW YORK CITY CONFERENCE 
 This appendix presents the text of the two hypothetical cases 
that we report in this paper that we used at the New York City 
conference, with variations noted in brackets. We also present the 
“skills assessment” question and the demographic questions asked at 
this conference. 
Nonpayment Case 
Imagine that you are presiding in a nonpayment case filed by a 
landlord against a tenant whom he claims is delinquent on his rent. 
During the proceeding, you learn that the monthly rent is 
[$2,000/$2,100], but the landlord imposes a $50 per month 
[surcharge/discount] if the tenant chooses to pay by credit card. Do 





Human Rights Complaint 
Suppose you are presiding over a pre-trial hearing involving the 
New York City Human Rights Law. Malcolm Jones, a fourteen-year 
old African-American boy, has filed a complaint against a large toy 
store in Midtown Manhattan. Jones alleges that he was harassed and 
detained by the store because of his race. 
The hearing revealed that Jones was in the store one day with 
several friends. By his own admission, he and four friends were being 
loud, pushing and shoving, and “playing around” inside the store. He 
admitted that they had made a mess of the stuffed animal section. 
Jones claimed they moved on to play some of the video games that 
the store makes available for customers. Jones claims that he 
wandered around in the section, played a little, and then was wrestled 
to the floor roughly and handcuffed by a guard. The guard dragged 
him into a back room and accused him of shoplifting. Jones and two 
of his friends contend that the guard used several racial slurs. 
At the hearing, a guard testified that he began watching “that 
little pack” when they messed up the stuffed animals. “I kept a close 
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eye on that one especially”, as he pointed to Jones. He stated that he 
followed the boys into the video game section to keep an eye on 
them. He stated that a small game cartridge had been placed 
temporarily by a clerk onto a countertop, and that “that punk spotted 
it right away.” The guard claimed that he saw Jones ease over to the 
countertop, and when he walked away, “the cartridge was gone.” The 
guard then arrested Jones for shoplifting. 
The guard admitted that among the five boys who came in 
together, Jones was the only African-American (the others were 
white), but denies that this made any difference to him. The guard 
stated, “that kid looked like trouble; it wasn’t because he was black.”  
The game cartridge was, in fact, [found inside Jones’ coat/not 
found on Jones]. [Jones claims he intended to pay for it, even though 
he did not have enough money with him to buy it./ The guard claims 
“he must have ditched it somehow when he saw me coming.”] 
You must issue a report in which you conclude whether the store 
likely discriminated against Jones because of his race, or not. Given 
these facts, what is your opinion? 
____Yes, Jones was likely discriminated against because of his 
race 
____No, Jones was likely not discriminated against because of his 
race 
Skills Self-Assessment 
Relative to the other judges attending this conference, how 
would you rate yourself on the following: 
Assessing the credibility of a witness 
____In the highest quartile (meaning that you are more skilled at 
this than 75% of the judges attending this conference) 
____In the second highest quartile (meaning that you are more 
skilled at this than 50% of the judges in this room, but less 
skilled than 25% of the judges attending this conference) 
____In the second lowest quartile (meaning that you are more 
skilled at this than 25% of the judges in this room, but less 
skilled than 50% of the judges attending this conference) 
____In the lowest quartile (meaning that you are less skilled at 
this than 75% of the judges attending this conference) 
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[Note that we also used the same 4 categories for the three skills 
listed below:] 
Avoiding racial bias in making decisions 
Facilitating settlements 
Demographic Information 
Please identify your gender: 
____male 
____female 
For how many years have you served as a judge?____ years 
What type of cases do you normally hear?_______________ 
Which of the two major political parties in the United States 
most closely matches your own political beliefs? 
 _____The Republican Party 
 _____The Democratic Party 
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APPENDIX B:  MATERIALS USED AT THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE 
This appendix presents the text of the three hypothetical cases 
that we report in this paper that we used at the New York City 
conference, with variations noted in brackets. We used the same 
demographic questions as in the New York City Conference. 
Employment Case 
Imagine that you are presiding in a case involving an 
employment dispute between Dina El Saba, a public sector employee, 
and the agency for which she previously worked. Dina was an 
administrative assistant for a senior manager named Peter before the 
agency terminated her employment. At the agency, her employment 
evaluations were all “average” to “above-average,” so she contends 
her termination was motivated by unlawful discrimination. Peter 
concedes that Dina’s performance evaluations were as she claims, but 
he reports that the agency terminated her for repeatedly violating 
workplace rules and norms. Among other things, Dina took too many 
breaks during the workday and took odd days off as holidays. He also 
claims she dressed in ways that made her coworkers and agency 
visitors feel uncomfortable, covering herself mostly in black. He also 
contends that she acted “odd” and “aloof”, refusing to eat lunch while 
male coworkers were present in the break room. 
Based solely on these facts, how likely is it that: (Please rank 
these in order of likelihood, where “1” is the most likely, “2” is the 
second-most likely, “3” is the third-most likely, and “4” is the least 
likely.) 
_____The agency unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on 
her Islamic religious beliefs. 
_____The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce. 
_____The agency adhered to its internal employment policies. 
_____The agency actively recruited a diverse workforce but also 
unlawfully discriminated against Dina based on her Islamic 
religious beliefs . 
Veronica v. AAC 
Imagine that you are presiding over an employment 
discrimination case brought by the City Commission on Human 
Rights (“Commission”) on behalf of Veronica Sanchez, a Mexican-
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American who legally immigrated to the U.S., against Administrative 
Assistants on Call, LLC. (“AAC”). The Commission alleges that 
AAC violated the Administrative Code by terminating Veronica 
based on her “actual or perceived” race, color, national origin, and 
alienage or citizenship status. 
AAC enters into contracts with small businesses to provide off-
site secretarial and administrative support services. Until six months 
ago, Veronica was one of AAC’s top employees. Six months ago, 
however, AAC hired a new manager, and according to Veronica, he 
immediately gave her only undesirable projects. Veronica testified 
that he used racially offensive terms in her presence; told her on a 
couple of occasions to “go back to Mexico”; and accused her of taking 
jobs from “real Americans.” On one occasion, he made comments 
like these in front of one of Veronica’s former coworkers, who 
corroborated Veronica’s testimony, and in front of Veronica’s 
daughter, who was visiting her at work that day. Veronica complained 
to the manager, who then fired her. 
AAC does not deny Veronica’s allegations, but AAC contests 
the Commission’s request for damages on Veronica’s behalf. AAC’s 
owner testified that the company eventually fired the manager and 
noted that Veronica found comparable employment shortly after her 
termination, and she therefore does not even make a claim for lost 
wages. 
The Commission seeks compensatory damages on Veronica’s 
behalf. Under the Administrative Code, you are authorized to award 
compensatory damages for “mental anguish,” and controlling case 
law indicates that an award is justified where “there is credible 
evidence of some degree of emotional distress.” Here, Veronica 
testified credibly that she has suffered from anxiety, sleeplessness, 
and bad dreams. She also mentioned as an aside that she recently saw 
a case similar to hers on a “court television show” where the plaintiff 
received a [$415,300] compensatory damage award for mental 
anguish. 
Commission practice gives you broad discretion, [and experience 
indicates that review of your award by the Commission’s appellate 
panel is extremely unlikely/ but experience indicates that review of 
your award and your explanation by the Commission’s appellate 
panel is very likely.] 
RACHLINSKI IN FINAL.DOC 5/5/2009  4:08:30 PM 
2009] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES 1529 
Based solely on these facts, what compensatory damages would 
you award Veronica for mental anguish? 
$_______________ 







Imagine that you are presiding over a case brought by the 
Department of Health against a restaurant called Café Des Artists for 
an alleged Health Code violation. 
The source of the complaint is a citation against the Café for an 
alleged rat problem. The City Health Department sent an inspector 
to the restaurant after neighbors complained of a rat infestation in the 
Café and the alleyway behind it. The inspector visited the site and 
found two large rat traps in the basement of the Café and an empty 
box of rat poison. He also took statements from a neighbor who 
indicated that he had complained about the rats, but that the Café’s 
owner has refused to do anything about it. The neighbor asserted that 
he had seen the rats almost daily, mostly “coming out of the kitchen”. 
Based on this evidence, the inspector cited the Café for a violation of 
the City’s Health Code. 
Both the neighbor and the inspector testified at the hearing. The 
inspector restated the facts above. The neighbor added that he has a 
friend who also saw rats when he visited from out of town, but this 
friend was not available to testify. [He produced a photo of rats on 
the floor of the kitchen (see below), which he contends was taken by 
his friend through an open door of the restaurant’s kitchen. He claims 
the friend sent him the photo by e-mail.] 
At the hearing, the Café’s owner denied that there are rats in his 
restaurant. He claims he has seen no rats in the restaurant and that he 
has received no complaints from the neighbors. He asserts that the 
traps and empty box of poison must have been left there by a 
previous owner before he took over the restaurant a year ago. [He 
denies that the photo was taken in the restaurant. At the hearing his 
lawyer objected to the use of the photo as lacking sufficient 
authentication and moved that it be excluded.] 
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[How would you rule on the motion to exclude the photograph? 
____Deny the motion and admit the photograph into evidence 
____Grant the motion and exclude the photograph from 
evidence] 
The Health Codes specifies that the Health Department has the 
burden of demonstrating that a violation occurred. If you find that a 
violation occurred, then you may levy a fine of up to $2,000. 
Based solely on the evidence admitted at the hearing, what fine, 
if any, would you impose on the Café owner? 
$_______________ 
The Photo: 
 
 
